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STAND OR DELIVER:  CITIZEN SUITS,
STANDING, AND ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION
JONATHAN H. ADLER*
Give me where to stand, and I will move the earth.
Archimedes
Stand in the place where you live.
R.E.M.
INTRODUCTION
Until Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Serv-
ices, Inc.,1 it appeared that a majority of the Supreme Court would
keep many environmental citizen-suit plaintiffs out of court.  In Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife,2 and other cases,3 the Court’s majority placed
Constitutional and prudential limits on standing for environmental
citizen suits.  The New York Times reported that this trend was one of
the “most profound setbacks for the environmental movement in
decades.”4  Justice Harry Blackmun accused the Court’s Lujan ma-
* Law Clerk for The Honorable David B. Sentelle, United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit. This article was prepared while the author was a Senior Fellow
in Environmental Policy at the Competitive Enterprise Institute, for the Duke Environmental
Law & Policy Forum symposium, “Citizens Suits and the Future of Standing in the 21st Century:
From Lujan to Laidlaw and Beyond,” March 2-3, 2000.  The author would like to thank all
those who provided useful comments and critiques, including Michael S. Greve, Sam Kazman,
Michael O’Neill, David Riggs, David Schoenbrod, Maxwell L. Stearns, and Todd J. Zywicki.  Of
course, any remaining errors are solely the fault of the author.
1. 528 U.S. 167 (2000)
2. 504 U.S. 555 (1992)
3. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (1998); Lujan v. National
Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990).  Environmental activists also raised concerns about the
Court’s willingness to recognize the standing of ranchers to challenge a determination under the
Endangered Species Act.  See generally, Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
4. William Glaberson, Novel Antipollution Tool Is Being Upset by Courts, N.Y. TIMES,
June 5, 1999, at A1.
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jority of taking a “slash and burn expedition through the law of envi-
ronmental standing.”5  The losing counsel in Lujan accused the Su-
preme Court of putting environmental attorneys “out of business.”6
In 1999, John Echeverria and Jon Zeidler warned that the very “abil-
ity of American citizens to vindicate their legal rights to a clean and
healthy environment is rapidly eroding.”7  With Laidlaw, the Supreme
Court reversed course, lowering the standing barriers faced by envi-
ronmental citizen-suit plaintiffs.  From this standpoint, the Supreme
Court’s Laidlaw decision was “a win for the environment.”8
This perspective on standing assumes that citizen suits play an
important role in safeguarding environmental values.9  By implica-
tion, any legal doctrine, such as that embodied in Lujan, which cur-
tails citizen suits is “anti-environmental.”  Citizen suits, insofar as
they enhance governmental enforcement of environmental laws and
prompt cleanup, should be environmentally beneficial.  Yet this
“conventional view,” which equates more liberal citizen-suit standing
rules with greater environmental protection, is in the words of one
commentator, “too facile.”10  More environmental citizen suits do not
necessarily yield better environmental protection.
The Laidlaw decision certainly will benefit citizen-suit plaintiffs.
This does not mean, however, that Laidlaw will advance environ-
mental protection.  Ecological values may well be better protected
under a set of standing rules, such as those embodied in Justice
Scalia’s Lujan opinion, which require a demonstration of environ-
mental harm.  This article argues that liberalized standing rules that
disconnect standing from a concrete and particularized injury in fact
cannot be assumed to enhance environmental quality.  Nor will in-
creasing the volume of citizen suits inexorably increase the effective-
ness of environmental regulation.  This article further presents evi-
5. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 605 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also,
Karin Sheldon, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: The Supreme Court’s Slash and Burn Approach
to Environmental Standing, 23 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,031, 10,031 (Jan. 1993).
6. See Marcia Coyle & Marianne Lavelle, Eco-Groups Standing Curtailed, NAT’L L.J.,
June 22, 1992, at 3 (quoting Brian O’Neil).
7. See John D. Echeverria & Jon T. Zeidler, Barely Standing: The Erosion of Citizen
“Standing” to Sue to Enforce Federal Environmental Law at 1 (Envtl. Policy Project, George-
town University Law Ctr., June 1999).
8. See A Win for the Environment, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 2000, at B6.
9. Ann Carlson notes that the critical commentaries on Lujan “all assume that a standing
doctrine making access to federal courts open ended to environmental plaintiffs will help the
environmental cause.”  See Ann E. Carlson, Standing for the Environment, 45 UCLA L. REV.
931, 935 (1998).
10. See id.
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dence suggesting that expansive citizen-suit litigation may even exac-
erbate the environmental failings of the current regulatory regime.
Whether a liberalized standing regime enhances or undermines envi-
ronmental protection is an open question.11  In the meantime, there
are many reasons to believe that an alternative framework for envi-
ronmental citizen-suit standing would do more to advance the protec-
tion of environmental resources.
Part I of this article provides an overview of environmental citi-
zen suits in theory and practice, with a particular focus on the use of
citizen suits to enforce environmental regulations against emitters.
While environmental citizen suits are designed to improve regulatory
enforcement, and thereby reduce pollution, the pattern of litigation
suggests that citizen suits do not consistently serve this purpose.  Part
II provides a brief overview of the role of standing in citizen-suit liti-
gation.  It examines the Court’s competing approaches to standing, as
typified by Lujan and Laidlaw and the latter decision’s likely effect
on citizen suits.  As already intimated, Laidlaw will make it much
easier for prospective plaintiffs to file citizen suits under existing envi-
ronmental laws.  Part III outlines the theoretical and empirical basis
for questioning the importance of liberal standing rules for environ-
mental protection.  More citizen suits will not necessarily produce
greater environmental protection and, in some cases, will exacerbate
the failings of the existing regulatory regime.  Part IV suggests an al-
ternative approach to citizen-based environmental protection that re-
places conventional citizen-suit provisions with property rights in en-
vironmental resources.  Rather than liberalizing standing rules by
eliminating the injury in fact requirement, this article proposes the ex-
tension of property rights in environmental resources. By giving pro-
spective plaintiffs a defined place to stand, property rules can encour-
age greater protection of environmental resources.
I. ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZEN SUITS
Since the late 1960s, environmental activist groups have used
state and federal courts to steer the course of environmental policy.12
Several groups, including the Natural Resources Defense Council
(NRDC) and Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund (since renamed the
11. As discussed infra Part I.B, there has been little empirical work on the actual effects of
environmental citizen suits on environmental protection.  What work has been done suggests
the environmental value of citizen suits under current law is overrated.
12. This development is briefly summarized in JONATHAN H. ADLER,
ENVIRONMENTALISM AT THE CROSSROADS 42-48 (1995).
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Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund), were formed for precisely this
purpose.  Over time, environmental litigators have demonstrated that
legal victories in the right cases can have profound effects nationwide.
To some environmental activists, “litigation is the most important
thing the environmental movement has done” since the early 1970s.13
Most major federal environmental laws contain citizen-suit provi-
sions.  As a result, environmental citizen suits are now “a central ele-
ment of American environmental law.”14
A. Theory
Most environmental regulations are premised upon the theory of
“market failure.”15  In the simplest of terms, markets “fail” to account
for the external environmental costs—“externalities”—produced by
various activities, from the production of steel and generation of
power to the disposal of waste and hauling of freight.16  When a fac-
tory pollutes, for example, the costs are “externalized;” they are im-
posed upon others, presumably without their consent.  Environmental
impacts receive insufficient attention in the marketplace because the
costs of these impacts are not accounted for in the price signals that
regulate market transactions.  Government intervention in the form
of regulations or fiscal instruments is required to constrain private ac-
tions that would otherwise cause environmental harm.  Thus, various
state and federal agencies are instructed to prevent private parties,
typically private corporations, from emitting various substances into
the air and water beyond politically prescribed limits.  Under the
Clean Water Act17 and other laws, emissions beyond the limits pre-
scribed in the Code of Federal Regulations or an individual facility
permit are strictly prohibited, and punishable by substantial fines.
13. See Tom Turner, The Legal Eagles, in CROSSROADS: ENVIRONMENTAL PRIORITIES
FOR THE FUTURE 53 (P. Borelli ed., 1988) (quoting Rick Sutherland, then-executive director of
the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund).
14. See George Van Cleve, Congressional Power to Confer Broad Citizen Standing in Envi-
ronmental Cases, 29 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,028, 10,028 (Jan. 1999). See also Echeverria & Zeidler,
supra note 7, at 1 (arguing that citizen suits are “one of the basic features of our nation’s envi-
ronmental protection system”).
15. See, e.g., TOM TIETENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE
ECONOMICS 51-54 (3d ed., 1992).  For an alternative framework, see Fred L. Smith, Jr., Markets
and the Environment: A Critical Reappraisal, 13 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 62 (1995) and infra
Part IV.
16. Of course, few analysts ever recommend government intervention to assist in the inter-
nalization of positive externalities.
17. Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water) Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994 & Supp.
IV 1998).
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There are reasons to suspect that the current regulatory regime is
itself far from optimal.  Political institutions are no less prone to
“failure” than markets.18  Even if one assumes that Congress has en-
acted the ideal legislative framework for addressing pollution prob-
lems, these rules must be implemented and enforced.  Regulatory
agencies face various hurdles that can limit their ability to provide the
optimal level of enforcement.  In particular, agencies are constrained
by scarce resources, limited information, and political pressures.  This
is as true in the environmental field as it is in any other.19  For this
reason, starting in 1970 Congress enacted environmental citizen-suit
provisions to help address these concerns by enabling local citizens
and environmental groups to supplement governmental enforcement
efforts.20  Congress sought to “extend[] the concept of public partici-
pation to the enforcement process.”21  This participation would in-
clude the right to second-guess governmental enforcement decisions.
As Cass Sunstein observed, the citizen-suit device is “a mechanism
for controlling unlawfully inadequate enforcement of the law.”22
Tens of thousands of facilities are subject to federal environ-
mental regulations nationwide.  On any given day, a substantial por-
tion of these facilities violates the technical requirements imposed by
environmental regulations.  Given the vast number of regulatory vio-
lations, “[i]t is not feasible to assume that the government is going to
engage in the inspections and the enforcement necessary to ensure
compliance with the standards.”23  Allowing for citizen suits theoreti-
cally fills the void by deputizing countless private citizens and activist
groups to act as private attorneys general without any public over-
sight.
18. See, e.g., JAMES BUCHANAN, EXPLORATIONS INTO CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 28
(1989) (noting that insofar as “markets fail, . . .‘politics fails’ when evaluated by the same crite-
ria”).
19. See David R. Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental Law in a Triangular Federal Sys-
tem: Can Three Not Be a Crowd When Enforcement Authority Is Shared by the United States, the
States, and Their Citizens?, 54 MD. L. REV. 1552, 1560 (1995).
20. For example, Congress included citizen-suit provisions in the Clean Water Act to en-
sure that “if the Federal, State, and local agencies fail to exercise their enforcement responsibil-
ity, the public is provided the right to seek vigorous enforcement action.”  See S. REP. NO. 92-
414, at 64 (1972).  “Congress . . . recognized that government enforcement alone would not be
sufficient to insure that the goals were met.” Hodas, supra note 19, at 1555.
21. See 116 CONG. REC. 32, 903 (1970) (statement of Sen. Muskie).
22. See Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan?  Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and
Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 165 (1992).
23. Richard Lazarus, Panel II: Public vs. Private Regulation, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 431, 472
(1994).
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Centralized regulatory agencies are further limited in their abil-
ity to provide optimal enforcement of environmental regulations be-
cause they have limited information.  The environmental impact of
various activities will vary from place to place, and local knowledge
and expertise is necessary to identify those environmental impacts
which are of greatest concern.  This sort of location-specific informa-
tion is inherently beyond the reach of centralized regulatory agen-
cies.24  Local citizen groups, on the other hand, may be in a better po-
sition to observe these effects and act accordingly.
Citizen suits also can operate to prevent political considerations
within the executive department from limiting enforcement activi-
ties.25  In their amicus curiae brief submitted in the Laidlaw case, John
Echeverria and Jon Zeidler argue that “[t]he citizen suit provision of
the Clean Water Act represents a reasonable and entirely legitimate
effort by Congress to promote effective implementation of the Act
and to counteract the danger that the regulated community could suc-
cessfully undermine the Act during the administrative implementa-
tion process.”26  In this sense, citizen suits can guard against “agency
capture.”27  According to the late Judge Skelly Wright, one aim of en-
vironmental citizen suits is “to see that important legislative purposes
heralded in the halls of Congress are not lost or misdirected in the
vast hallways of the federal bureaucracy.”28  Since citizen-suit provi-
sions entitle members of the public at large to bring suit, subject to
minimal constraints, there is little danger that political considerations
will prevent the initiation of a suit necessary to address pressing envi-
ronmental harm.
24. See HENRY N. BUTLER & JONATHAN R. MACEY, USING FEDERALISM TO IMPROVE
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 27 (1996) (“Federal regulators never have been and never will be
able to acquire and assimilate the enormous amount of information necessary to make optimal
regulatory judgments that reflect the technical requirements of particular locations and pollu-
tion sources.”).
25. Some would argue that the nature of executive authority should include the authority
to make “political” judgments about how to allocate prosecutorial resources.
26. See Brief Amicus Curiae for Americans for the Environment at 2, Friends of the Earth,
Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000) (No. 98-822).
27. See, e.g., Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement, 34
BUFF. L. REV. 833, 843 (1985) (“The modern citizen suit provisions were first enacted at a time
when ‘capture’ theories dominated scholarly and popular thought about regulation.”); Hodas,
supra note 19, at 1624; Sunstein supra note 22, at 192-93.
28. See Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109,
1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971).  It is worth noting that then-Judge Scalia commented that one aim of
limiting standing is to ensure that some actions are “lost or misdirected” within the federal bu-
reaucracy.  See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separa-
tion of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 897 (1983).
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There may also be broader institutional limits on the public’s
ability to mobilize countervailing political pressure against govern-
ment agencies.  “It is a commonplace observation that the diffuse na-
ture of environmental harms makes environmental interests relatively
difficult to organize into an effective political force.”29  More broadly,
some argue that  “as a result of free rider problems and the high costs
of collective political action, effective expression of the broad public
interest in environmental protection faces major obstacles in the
American political system.”30  Citizen-suit provisions address this con-
cern by enabling a small group of individuals to enforce environ-
mental regulations directly without any concern for political con-
straints.
Underlying all of these arguments is the idea that public-spirited
activists and citizen groups concerned about local environmental
problems will utilize environmental citizen-suit provisions; “environ-
mental citizen-plaintiffs are supposed to be altruists.”31  Thus, envi-
ronmental citizen-suit provisions, unlike those in other contexts, do
not explicitly provide for “bounties” paid to the initiators of the suit.
Attorneys’ fees and litigation costs may be recovered and, under the
Clean Water Act, suits may produce fines payable to the treasury, but
(at least in theory) there is no direct payment to the group bringing
the suit.32  In theory, this should ensure that citizen suits are used pri-
marily for the protection of environmental quality.
29. Echeverria & Zeidler, supra note 7, at 8.
30. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Americans for the Environment at 1-2, Laidlaw, (No. 98-
822).  Of course, this has not stopped the profusion of environmental statutes and regulations
over the past three decades.  If the free rider problem is a substantial limitation on environ-
mental protection, one must ask why so many environmental laws were enacted in the first
place.  See Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 59, 59 (1992) (noting that “from the perspective of positive political theory, the puzzle is
not that Congress produces public goods such as clean air so inefficiently, but that Congress
manages to produce any public goods at all”).  One possible explanation is that environmental
regulations benefit various special interests.  See Todd J. Zywicki, Environmental Externalities
and Political Externalities: The Political Economy of Environmental Regulation and Reform, 73
TUL. L. REV. 845, 856 (1999); ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: PUBLIC COSTS, PRIVATE REWARDS
(Michael S. Greve & Fred L. Smith, Jr., eds., 1992).  This thesis can explain the enactment of at
least some environmental laws.  See E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evo-
lution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 326-29 (1985) (dis-
cussing efforts by large automakers to preempt state regulations with uniform federal stan-
dards); See generally Jonathan H. Adler, Clean Politics, Dirty Profits: Rent-Seeking Behind the
Green Curtain, in POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTALISM: GOING BEHIND THE GREEN CURTAIN (T.
Anderson ed., 2000).
31. See Michael S. Greve, The Private Enforcement of Environmental Law, 65 TUL. L.
REV. 339, 341 (1990).
32. This does not mean that groups utilizing citizen-suit provisions cannot reap economic
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B. Practice
Every major environmental statute contains a citizen-suit provi-
sion save one.33  These provisions authorize private suits against pri-
vate parties that violate federal law, as well as against the EPA Ad-
ministrator for failing to perform her statutorily mandated duties.
The standard environmental citizen-suit provision authorizes “any
person” or “any citizen” to bring suit against “any person” that is al-
legedly violating the environmental law in question.34  As a practical
matter, this means that the vast majority of companies are potential
citizen-suit targets.  In a recent survey of corporate counsels, only 30
percent believed it was possible for their firm to comply fully with
state and federal environmental requirements.35  As the authors of
one environmental treatise point out, “it is virtually impossible for a
major company . . . to be in complete compliance with all regulatory
requirements” and yet “virtually every instance of noncompliance can
be readily translated into a violation.”36
Typically, the citizen must notify the federal EPA, the state
regulatory agency, and the entity alleged to be in violation of the law
sixty days before commencement of the suit.37  The notice require-
ment affords the subject of the suit “an opportunity to bring itself into
rewards.  See infra notes 54-57.
33. See Air Pollution Prevention and Control (Clean Air) Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1994);
Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water) Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1994); Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §
9659(a) (1994); Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA) 42 U.S.C. §
11046(a)(1) (1994); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1994);
Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); Toxic Substances Control
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1994).  The one major environmental statute without a citizen-suit provi-
sion is the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 136 et seq.
(1994).
34. The Clean Water Act’s formulation is a bit different.  Tracking the language of the Su-
preme Court’s Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), decision, the CWA provides jurisdic-
tion over suits filed by  “a person or persons having an interest, which is or may be adversely
affected.”  See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g) (1994).
35. Figure cited in Marianne Lavelle, Environmental Vise: Law, Compliance, NAT’L L.J.,
August 30, 1993, at S1.
36. See CHRISTOPHER HARRIS ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES 1-8 (1992).  As the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency similarly observed, “a regulated hazardous waste handler must do
hundreds of things correctly to fully comply with the regulations, yet doing only one thing wrong
makes the handler a violator.”  See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, THE
NATION’S HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM AT A CROSSROADS: THE RCRA
IMPLEMENTATION STUDY 36 (July 1990).
37. The Clean Water Act and the RCRA contain exceptions to this requirement for suits
against the EPA Administrator under specified provisions.  See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1994); 42
U.S.C. § 6972(c) (1994).
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complete compliance . . . and thus . . . render unnecessary a citizen
suit.”38  If the EPA or relevant state agency has already begun en-
forcement action against the alleged violator before the suit is com-
menced, the citizen suit is barred.  This is true even if the state or fed-
eral prosecution began after notice of intent to sue was given.  One
purpose of the notice provision is to enable the relevant state or fed-
eral regulatory agency to preclude the citizen suit with an enforce-
ment action of its own.  In practice, however, such preclusion rarely
occurs, especially by the federal government.39
Most environmental citizen-suit provisions only provide for in-
junctive relief and legal costs, (including attorneys’ fees) for success-
ful plaintiffs.  Whether the suit is against a regulatory agency or a pri-
vate party, the relief is aimed at remedying the permit violation or
other illegal action.  In this regard the Clean Water Act (CWA) and
Clean Air Act (CAA), as amended in 1990, are exceptions.  Under
the CWA and CAA, environmental citizen-suit plaintiffs are empow-
ered to sue private firms for civil fines payable to the treasury.  In the
case of the CWA, these fines can be substantial, up to $25,000 per
violation, per day.40  In theory, these fines help to deter future viola-
tions.41
The CWA’s regulatory framework, in particular its combination
of reporting requirements and strict liability for permit violations, is
particularly favorable to prospective plaintiffs.  Companies are re-
quired to obtain permits, as well as to report on their emissions.  A
violation of the Act is determined by an exceedence of the emission
level specified in the permit, not the degradation of water quality.42
As one commentator noted, “if the discharge violates the explicit
terms of the permit, the discharger has violated the CWA, even if
there is no scientifically identifiable adverse impact on the receiving
water.”43  Once liability is so determined, courts are instructed to as-
38. See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 60
(1987) (applying the Clean Water Act).
39. See Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 27, at 897-98.  In the Laidlaw case, Friends of the
Earth’s citizen suit was almost barred by the “diligent prosecution” provisions by the South
Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control’s filing of a complaint.  The com-
plaint, however, was drafted and filed by Laidlaw on behalf of the state agency.  The district
court found this to be less-than-diligent prosecution of Laidlaw’s technical violations.  See
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 890 F. Supp. 470, 498 (D.S.C. 1995).
40. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1994).
41. According to the Court, “all civil penalties have some deterrent effect.” See Hudson v.
United States, 522 U.S. 93, 102 (1997).
42. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1994).
43. See Hodas, supra note 19, at 1565 (emphasis added).
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sess civil fines against the offending company.44  The “ease of devel-
oping cases from public records” under the CWA most likely explains
why more citizen suits are filed under CWA than under any of the
other major media-specific environmental laws.45  This structure also
facilitates the selection of enforcement targets for non-environmental
reasons.
The ostensible purpose of environmental citizen-suit provisions
is to empower local groups to ensure that federal regulations are en-
forced and that environmental problems are corrected.  When federal
regulators overlook local environmental deterioration or are com-
promised by interest group pressure, local groups in affected areas
are empowered to trigger enforcement themselves.  Empirical re-
search suggests that citizen suits have not worked out that way.  His-
torically national environmental groups have filed a large proportion
of environmental citizen suits.  In Michael Greve’s review of citizen-
suit activity under the Clean Water Act in the 1980s, he found that
five national organizations—the Natural Resources Defense Council,
Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, Atlantic States Legal Foundation,
Public Interest Research Group, and Friends of the Earth—were re-
sponsible for the majority of suits filed from May 1984 to September
1988.46  A later review found that “the vast majority of penalties col-
lected between 1988 and 1993—$9.3 million out of a total of $11.3
million—were obtained in cases brought by four respected (if not al-
ways liked) groups who carefully screened potential cases.”47  While
local groups filed suits as well, these were in the minority.
More interesting to note is that the pattern of litigation did not
correlate with environmental concerns.  The national groups filed
most of their suits against private industry even though municipalities
and agriculture were responsible for a greater share of water pollu-
tion.  Indeed, between 1984 and 1988, there were over six times as
many CWA citizen suits against industrial facilities as there were
against governmental entities.  “This pronounced preference for pro-
ceeding against private industry cannot be explained by environ-
mental considerations—municipal facilities cause far more water
44. Under the Clean Water Act, violators “shall” be subject to civil fines. See 33 U.S.C. §
1319(d).
45. See Adeed Fadil, Citizen Suits Against Polluters: Picking Up the Pace, 9 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 23, 66 (1985).
46. See Greve, supra note 31, at 353.
47. See Peter H. Lehner, The Efficiency of Citizens Suits, 2 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK 4, 8
(1995).
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pollution than private industry, and violate their [CWA] permits far
more frequently.”48  Citizen suits are indeed filed against municipal
dischargers, but what little empirical work has been done on the sub-
ject suggests they are in the minority, despite the large share of water
pollution that comes from municipal sources.
The CWA regulatory regime facilitates enforcement of permit
terms as it is relatively easy to determine whether the permit has been
violated—and extremely easy to prevail in court once a permit viola-
tion is found.  It does not, however, ensure that any given enforce-
ment action results in environmental improvement.  Compliance with
permit terms does not ensure water quality, as the permit terms do
not correlate with those measures that are necessary to maintain wa-
ter quality.  While some 6,700 point sources nationwide are subject to
NPDES permits, these permits only limit the emissions of the largest
emitters—the point sources.  For many water bodies the greatest
sources of pollution are largely uncontrolled non-point sources.
Thus, full enforcement of the Clean Water Act will not necessarily
maximize environmental protection.49
Existing citizen-suit provisions also expand the likelihood that
enforcement actions will be taken without regard to environmental
benefits.50  Government prosecutors, unlike private citizen plaintiffs,
face budgetary and political constraints that limit their ability to
prosecute every technical offense.  As a result, government prosecu-
tors are encouraged to focus their resources on the most egregious of-
fenses. 51  Citizen-suit plaintiffs, on the other hand, do not face similar
constraints.  Their financial resources are certainly limited, but they
face no significant political repercussions for setting unwise enforce-
ment priorities.  Moreover, by reducing the costs of litigation against
noncomplying sources, and increasing the likelihood of victory when
a suit is filed, the citizen-suit regime facilitates greater enforcement
48. Greve, supra note 31, at 362.
49. As some analysts have observed, “none of the available data” can demonstrate that
water quality nationwide is demonstrably better than it would have been absent the Clean Wa-
ter Act.  See A. Myrick Freeman, III, Water Pollution Policy, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 97, 114 (Paul Portney ed., 1990).  See also Roger E. Meiners &
Bruce Yandle, Clean Water Legislation: Reauthorize or Repeal? in TAKING THE ENVIRONMENT
SERIOUSLY 73, 86-87 (Roger E. Meiners & Bruce Yandle eds., 1993).
50. See discussion infra notes 111-115 and accompanying text.
51. Although, it should be noted that political and other considerations can distort gov-
ernmental enforcement priorities as well.  See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Bean Counting for a
Better Earth: Environmental Enforcement at the EPA, REG., Spring 1998.  Nonetheless, political
agencies remain more accountable to the general public for their enforcement decisions than
private citizen-suit plaintiffs.
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for enforcement’s sake, irrespective of any environmental benefit.
This creates strong incentives for even the most ecology-minded envi-
ronmental activist to consider the relative ease of victory when setting
litigation priorities.
Just because there is no tangible environmental benefit from
many environmental citizen suits does not mean that such suits do not
benefit environmental organizations.  Environmental activist organi-
zations have “organizational incentives to bring suits for the purpose
of attracting or retaining members.” 52  Insofar as courts or legislatures
remove barriers to citizen suits, the relative role of such motivations
should increase.53 Greve’s research suggests that corporations were
the objects of most citizen suits in the 1980s because litigating groups
can profit from such litigation by obtaining attorneys’ fees or settle-
ments that can be used to finance subsequent litigation or other envi-
ronmental initiatives.  “Substantial portions of [citizen suit] settle-
ments constitute direct transfer payments to environmental groups,”
including above-cost attorney’s fees and payments to third-party envi-
ronmental groups to fund conservation efforts.54
Defendants have ample reason to settle when faced with a citizen
suit under the Clean Water Act or Clean Air Act.  Liability for a
permit violation is rarely in doubt.  The maximum potential fines are
substantial, and citizen-suit plaintiff attorneys’ fees can be as well.
Thus, when an environmental citizen-suit plaintiff offers to drop the
suit in exchange for an environmental restoration project funded by
the defendant, such an agreement is in both parties’ interest.  The cost
to the defendant is lower than the fines, and the plaintiff gets to de-
termine how the defendant’s money is spent.  Under the Clean Water
Act, the EPA Administrator and Attorney General are to have 45-
day notice of consent decree terms before they take effect in order to
review the terms, but such review is fairly cursory in practice.
The result of this dynamic can be settlements of several million
dollars or more; when the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund sued the
oil company Unocal, the settlement totaled over $5 million, including
approximately $2.5 million for the Trust for Public Land, another
non-profit environmental group.55  A 1987 Natural Resources De-
fense Council suit against Bethlehem Steel produced similar gains for
environmental activist groups.  In addition to over $1 million in fines,
52. See Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 27, at 840.
53. See id.
54. See Greve, supra note 31, at 356.
55. See id. at 358.
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Bethlehem was required to make sizeable contributions to the Trust
for Public Lands ($200,000), the National Fish and Wildlife Founda-
tion ($100,000), and Save Our Streams ($50,000).56  These cases are
not isolated.  Rather, it appears that there have been “scores of citi-
zen suits that have been settled in exchange for contributions to pri-
vate environmental causes.”57
In theory, environmental citizen-suit provisions are designed to
supplement inadequate government enforcement of environmental
laws with altruistic private initiatives.  The pattern of litigation sug-
gests otherwise.  The only empirical analyses of environmental citi-
zen-suit activity suggest that national advocacy groups file the lion’s
share of suits, and that most suits are filed against the least significant
sources.  By removing any need for the consideration of actual envi-
ronmental impacts, and driving down the costs of establishing defen-
dant liability, the citizen-suit provisions encourage the filing of suits
against vulnerable plaintiffs, irrespective of the environmental bene-
fit.  Under the CWA, the prospect of large fines further facilitates
rent extraction, through private settlements, again with little need to
consider the environmental results.  “[O]ne need not characterize
these private recoveries as extortion to recognize how they subvert
the intended scheme of citizen suits.”58
While some citizen suits are no doubt motivated by pure inten-
tions, and some certainly produce tangible environmental gains, it is
not clear how much environmental benefit citizen-suit provisions ac-
tually provide.  As discussed below, there is also reason to believe
that excessive citizen-suit litigation may produce environmental harm.
If so, liberalized standing rules may not yield net environmental gains.
II.  STANDING FROM LUJAN TO LAIDLAW
For a suit against an alleged polluter to proceed, a prospective
plaintiff must have standing.  This is true whether the prospective
plaintiff seeks to file a common law nuisance action or a statutorily
authorized environmental citizen suit.  Under the common law,
standing is based upon a particularized injury suffered by the plaintiff.
Citizen-suit standing, on the other hand, is a function both of judicial
interpretations and legislative enactment.  Congress’s power to be-
56. See ADLER, supra note 12, at 46.  See also Frank Cross, Rethinking Environmental Citi-
zen Suits, 8 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 55, 70-71 (1989) (discussing citizen-suit settlements
that included funding for the Izaak Walton League and other environmental groups).
57. See id. at 71.
58. Id.
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stow standing upon citizens to act as “private attorneys general” is
limited by both Constitutional and prudential considerations.  Even
where Congress’s intent to grant standing is clear, courts can only ex-
ercise jurisdiction over the claim if the plaintiff has “a sufficient stake
in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of
that controversy.”59
The Lujan and Laidlaw decisions represent two fundamentally
different approaches to citizen-suit standing.  Under Lujan, the re-
quirement of a tangible, particularized injury to the plaintiff—“an
injury in fact”—is an absolute prerequisite for standing under the
Constitution.60  Under Laidlaw, however, more speculative claims of
perceived threats to a statutorily recognized interest from govern-
mental action, suffice to establish a “sufficient stake” in the matter.
The cases cannot be reconciled without undermining the doctrinal ba-
sis of one, the other, or both.61
It is not the aim of this article to assess the constitutional validity
or doctrinal consistency of the Supreme Court’s various standing
opinions.  Rather, it is to assess the likely environmental impacts of
the Lujan and Laidlaw approaches to standing represented by Lujan
and Laidlaw respectively.  Because the two decisions are so different
in their premises and potential applications, they create two different
sets of incentives for potential plaintiffs in environmental citizen suits.
A. Lujan – Injury in Fact
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,62 the plaintiffs sought to chal-
lenge a Fish & Wildlife Service (FWS) determination that the Endan-
gered Species Act’s prohibition of federal activities “likely to jeop-
ardize the continued existence of any endangered species”63 is
inapplicable to actions in foreign countries.  In particular, the citizen-
suit plaintiffs—several environmental groups and some of their mem-
bers—alleged that the FWS’ policy would allow continued federal
funding of overseas projects that threatened endangered species in
59. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731 (1972).
60. For the purposes of this analysis, I am highlighting Justice Scalia’s opinion for the
Court.  Insofar as the Court’s holding was moderated by Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion,
the Lujan/Laidlaw dichotomy is less stark.
61. Although some of my colleagues at the symposium seek to distinguish the cases and
reconcile their holdings, the policy implications of the opinions authored by Justice Scalia in
Lujan and Justice Ginsburg in Laidlaw could not be more different, as Justice Scalia’s Laidlaw
dissent makes clear.  See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 198 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
62. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
63. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994).
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Egypt and Sri Lanka.  Plaintiffs’ standing was asserted through the af-
fidavits of two members of Defenders of Wildlife alleging that they
had visited the habitats of imperiled species, particularly the Nile
crocodile and Asian elephant, and that they hoped to do so again.
In rejecting the plaintiff’s standing, the Lujan court adopted a
limited approach to citizen-suit standing focused on identifying the
particular grievance suffered by the plaintiff.  The court held that the
permissible scope of standing conferrable by Congress is narrowly
circumscribed by the limits of Article III.64  In the Lujan court’s
words, the “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing” com-
prises “three elements:” 1) “the plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury
in fact,’” 2) a “causal connection between the injury and the conduct
complained of,” and 3) a likelihood that the “the injury will be ‘re-
dressed’ by a favorable decision.”65  The “injury in fact” must itself be
“concrete and particularized,” and “actual or imminent” as opposed
to “conjectural or hypothetical”66  In this sense, Lujan built upon the
court’s holding in Allen v. Wright that the standing requirement “has
a core component derived directly from the Constitution.  A plaintiff
must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s alleg-
edly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested re-
lief.”67
Lujan clearly focuses on a particularized injury, suffered by an
individual or other legally cognizable entity, not on an injury to some
common entitlement in a given regulatory process or outcome.  Un-
der Lujan, whether or not a party has standing “depends considerably
on whether the plaintiff is himself an object of the action (or foregone
action) at issue.”68  Where the plaintiff is the object of the govern-
ment’s action, there is “little question” that there has been an injury
in fact, and the plaintiff has standing.69  On the other hand, in those
cases in which “a plaintiff’s asserted injury arises from the govern-
ment’s allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of some-
64. Numerous commentators have made powerful arguments that the Lujan court’s ap-
proach to Article III standing was “ahistorical” and not based on the text of the Constitution.
See, e.g., Sunstein supra note 22; Steven L. Winter, What if Justice Scalia Took History and the
Rule of Law Seriously?, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. &. POL’Y F. 155, 163 (2001).  The constitutional
basis for the Lujan holding, or lack thereof, is beyond the scope of this article.
65. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
66. See id. at 560.
67. See 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
68. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.
69. See id. at 561-62.
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one else, much more is needed.”70  Moreover, on prudential grounds,
the courts require that “a plaintiff’s grievance must arguably fall
within the zone of interests protected or regulated by the statutory
provision . . . invoked in the suit.”71  According to the decision, mere
assertions that a plaintiff has used lands governed by a given regula-
tory decision, or plans to one day visit the habitat of a species that
may be endangered by a governmental action, are simply insuffi-
cient.72
The standing inquiry is designed to provide “an answer to the
very first question that is sometimes rudely asked when one person
complains of another’s actions: ‘What’s it to you?’”73  Without a con-
crete injury in fact, the plaintiff does not have a stake in the outcome
of the case or controversy.  If the plaintiff wins, there is no guarantee
that she is better off than she was before, and if the plaintiff loses, it is
uncertain whether she will be any the worse for wear.  When a plain-
tiff does not have such a personal stake in the outcome of the case or
controversy, there is less assurance that the plaintiff is motivated by a
genuine concern for protecting the interest that allegedly has been
harmed.  In the environmental context, when the plaintiff is not re-
quired to have a stake in a given environmental resource, there is less
assurance that the interest motivating the plaintiff is the well-being of
the threatened resource, rather than some other interest.74
“Pure” citizen suits, such as when a political activist sues to force
an agency action or extract rents from a private firm merely because
the letter of the law has been violated, are clearly precluded by the
Lujan approach.  The standing requirement set forth in Lujan cannot
be satisfied by a “congressional conferral upon all persons of an ab-
stract, self-contained, noninstrumental ‘right’ to have the Executive
observe the procedures required by the law,” such as the “right” cre-
ated by the various environmental citizen-suit provisions.75  The injury
suffered by the plaintiff in such cases is that suffered by each and
every citizen of the country, or at least all those in the generalized vi-
cinity of the alleged regulatory violation, whereas the Lujan approach
requires “some sort of personal harm that sets the plaintiff apart from
70. See id. at 562.
71. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997) (emphasis added).
72. See generally Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563-64; Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871,
886-889 (1990).
73. See Scalia, supra note 28, at 882
74. For examples of this, see infra Part III.A.
75. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573; see also Sunstein, supra note 22, at 226.
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the world at large. . . .”76  In this sense, the Lujan court limited the
scope of likely motivations for citizen-suit plaintiffs by requiring that
plaintiffs have a close, demonstrated relationship between their con-
crete and particularized interests and the government action or inac-
tion which they wish to challenge or supplement with private en-
forcement activity.77  In other words, Lujan precludes standing when
no tangible interest of the plaintiff is impacted in a measurable way.
Laidlaw adopted a different approach.
B. Laidlaw – Injury in Fiction
The plaintiffs in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environ-
mental Services, Inc. filed suit alleging that a Laidlaw facility had re-
peatedly violated its NPDES permit under the Clean Water Act.  In
particular, plaintiffs alleged that “Laidlaw consistently failed to meet
the permit’s stringent 1.3 ppb (parts per billion) daily average limit on
mercury discharges” into the North Tyger River.78  The district court
found that Laidlaw had violated its permit limits nearly 500 times
over several years, yet there was no evidence that Laidlaw’s dis-
charges had any impact on the river’s water quality.79  Indeed, the dis-
trict court explicitly found that the “permit violations at issue did not
result in any health risk or environmental harm” and that the river’s
water quality exceeded the quality necessary for recreation and
swimming.80
To support their claim for standing, the citizen-suit plaintiffs
submitted affidavits from local residents expressing their subjective
fears that Laidlaw’s discharges could be affecting water quality, de-
spite the absence of any scientific evidence to that effect.  Due to
their fears, the plaintiffs claimed that they used the river less often
than they might have had Laidlaw not violated its permits.  These
conjectural apprehensions, lacking any basis in the district court’s
76. MICHAEL S. GREVE, THE DEMISE OF ENVIRONMENTALISM IN AMERICAN LAW 45
(1996).  In this sense the Lujan approach to standing is quite similar to that required for a public
nuisance claim under the common law.
77. As one commentator noted, “stricter standing rules could even lead environmentalists
to think differently both about who is affected by the degradation of an environmental resource
and about how to resolve the trade offs inherent in many environmental solutions.”  See Carl-
son, supra note 9, at 936.
78. See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 176.
79. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 956 F. Supp. 588, 602
(D.S.C. 1997).
80. See id.  The district court found that “the overall quality of the river exceeds levels nec-
essary to support . . . recreation in and on the water.”  See id. at 600.
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findings of fact, were sufficient for seven members of the Supreme
Court to rule that the plaintiffs had standing.  “Injury in fact” became
injury in fiction.
While professing fealty to the Supreme Court’s standing prece-
dents, the approach adopted by the Laidlaw majority is starkly differ-
ent from that of the Lujan court in that it emptied the injury in fact
requirement of any real substantive content.  In Laidlaw, the Su-
preme Court explicitly held that there need not be any environmental
harm to support citizen-suit standing.  An individual plaintiff could
suffer a sufficient injury from a technical violation of a NPDES per-
mit, even though the permit violation resulted in no measurable im-
pact on water quality.  The plaintiffs’ mere knowledge that the permit
was violated, and the resulting subjective apprehensions, are suffi-
cient.
The “harm” in Laidlaw was not any measurable change in water
quality, scientifically hypothesized increase in risk from ingestion of
regulated chemicals, or harmless physical invasion of a defined prop-
erty interest.  The harm recognized by the Court was the lessening of
the “aesthetic and recreational values of the area” brought about by
nothing more than the plaintiffs’ beliefs that the repeated violation of
NPDES permits had a significant environmental impact.  That the
plaintiffs placed an indeterminate value on the North Tyger River,
and that they believed full enforcement of the Clean Water Act was
required to protect the river, meant that they could be harmed by
Laidlaw’s “unlawful conduct.”81  As the court explained:
The relevant showing for purposes of Article III standing, however,
is not injury to the environment, but injury to the plaintiff.  To in-
sist upon the former rather than the latter as part of the standing
inquiry . . . is to raise the standing hurdle higher than the necessary
showing for success on the merits in an action alleging noncompli-
ance with an NPDES permit.82
A technical violation of an environmental permit requirement
could produce no measurable impact, but nonetheless support stand-
ing if the citizen-suit plaintiffs claim to have modified their behavior
81. In this sense, Laidlaw effectively provides for standing based upon existence value, and
enables plaintiffs to litigate absent any tangible stake in the litigation’s outcome.  This is highly
problematic in the context of environmental law.  For a critique of the use of existence value in
environmental policy, see Donald J. Boudreaux et al., Talk Is Cheap: The Existence Value Fal-
lacy, 29 ENVTL. L. 765 (1999).  As the authors note, “[s]ound government policy cannot be
grounded upon allegations of subjective utility and disutility divorced from the obligation to
support those policies with action.”  See id. at 793.
82. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 181.
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as a result of their fears.83  This is sufficient for the plaintiff to claim
injury. Thus, under Laidlaw, the injury in fact requirement is not a
substantive hurdle, but merely a technical pleading requirement that
can be satisfied with something as simple as an affidavit alleging
“fear” or “concern” about a given legal violation in the vicinity.  Such
harm is “fairly traceable” to the defendant’s conduct, in that the de-
fendant’s illegal action causes plaintiffs’ fear.  Such harm is presuma-
bly redressable as well in that a favorable verdict will make the plain-
tiffs feel better.  But the “harm” itself is merely that someone broke
the law in the general vicinity of the plaintiffs.  This is a meager basis
upon which to confer standing.
The Court majority acknowledged that standing rules operate
“to ensure, among other things, that the scarce resources of the fed-
eral courts are devoted to those disputes in which the parties have a
concrete stake.”84  Yet if there need not be any environmental harm,
then there is no assurance that allowing standing results in any tangi-
ble environmental benefit.  And if there is no tangible environmental
benefit from the decision, it is difficult to see what “concrete stake”
the plaintiffs could have in the outcome, other than a generalized in-
terest in seeing the faithful execution of the laws.  Whereas the Court
typically denies standing on the basis of such diffused injuries, Laid-
law makes an exception for environmental law.  The relevant ques-
tion is whether the environment will be any the better for it.
III.  CITIZEN SUITS & ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION:
DOES STANDING DELIVER?
Expanding opportunities for environmental activist groups to en-
force environmental regulations through citizen suits will inevitably
tighten the existing regulatory regime.  Yet given the failings of the
current generation of command-and-control environmental regula-
tions, this may not translate into greater environmental protection.
As Cass Sunstein notes, the citizen suit “is probably best understood
as a Band-Aid superimposed on a system that can meet with only
mixed success.”85  Insofar as the environmental regulatory scheme is
ill-equipped to address given environmental concerns, increasing the
stringency of enforcement will do little, if anything, to advance eco-
83. As the dissent noted, the plaintiffs’ only real showings were “unsupported and unex-
plained affidavit allegations of ‘concern’” and that the “affiants have established nothing but
‘subjective apprehensions.’”  See 528 U.S. at 199 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
84.  Id. at 191.
85. Sunstein, supra note 22, at 222.
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logical values.  Insofar as detailed and complex regulatory provisions
provide opportunities for special-interest rent-seeking, citizen suits
can facilitate further exploitation outside of the legislative arena.  In-
sofar as existing environmental programs embody mistaken priorities,
citizen suits can amplify the improper emphases.  And insofar as the
existing regulatory regime is too rigid to allow for environmentally
beneficial innovation, citizen suits threaten to ossify the process even
more.  Indeed, as this section will attempt to show, increasing the vol-
ume of environmental citizen-suit litigation would well do less good
than harm.
A. Interests and Incentives
Environmental citizen suits facilitate and encourage litigation
over paperwork violations and permit exceedences, which may or
may not impact environmental quality.  Citizen suits “encourage envi-
ronmental litigants to supplement government enforcement activi-
ties.”86  They do not, however, provide any incentive to ferret out new
and undetected violations.87  Why bother investigating potential envi-
ronmental harm when a technical violation is sufficient to support
summary judgment?  Why search for clandestine violations when
permit reporting requirements force companies to provide potential
plaintiffs with all the data necessary to prove a technical violation?
As a result, the “incentive of the private attorney general under the
current system is . . . to focus on those pollution sources which have
already been identified in government filings, which are thus the
cheapest and easiest to proceed against in a lawsuit.”88  For this rea-
son, the priorities of environmental litigation outfits and individual
citizen-suit plaintiffs will not always align with the public’s interest in
greater environmental protection.
Citizen-suit provisions create incentives for environmentalist
plaintiffs to pursue their self-interest, in the form of settlements, re-
mediation projects, and attorneys’ fees, or to pursue symbolic victo-
ries with other value.89  Insofar as there is no real injury in fact re-
quirement, there is little incentive to redress particular environmental
86. Farber, supra note 30, at 73.
87. As noted infra notes 139-141, they also discourage such investigations by regulated en-
tities as well.
88. Jeremy Rabkin, Government Lawyering: The Secret Life of the Private Attorney Gen-
eral, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179, 191 (1998).
89. Citizen suits represent a relatively low cost way for environmental activist groups to
exercise “agenda control” or to otherwise advance ideological values without resort to the leg-
islative process.  See Zywicki, supra note 29, at 875.
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harms.  Indeed, prior to the Lujan decision, there is little reason to
believe that many environmental citizen plaintiffs even spent much
time considering the tangible environmental impacts of their suits.  It
was enough that a corporation had violated the law and that a suc-
cessful legal challenge was possible.90  Even commentators in favor of
broad citizen-suit standing acknowledge that “the issue of harm to the
individual is at best a tangential question in the litigation.”91
The lack of a substantive injury in fact requirement not only
shifts the incentives faced by those individuals that would consider
suing, it also increases the potential for rent-seeking and the pursuit
of other agendas.92  As noted above, there is good reason to believe
that at least some environmental litigation is motivated by economic
concerns.93  There is also substantial evidence that citizen-suit provi-
sions are often aimed at something other than securing the values
identified by the authorizing statute.94
Environmental citizen suits that purport to address one environ-
mental concern may well be aimed at another matter entirely.  For an
example of this phenomenon, one need look no further than one of
the most celebrated cases in environmental law—TVA v. Hill.95  This
case was ostensibly about saving the Tennessee Snail Darter, a fish
species believed to be threatened by construction of the Tellico Dam.
Yet the real aim of the TVA v. Hill litigation was not protecting the
fish, but stopping the dam.96  The Snail Darter merely provided a legal
90. As one attorney for the Natural Resources Defense Council commented, prior to Lu-
jan there was “a sense that the citizen suit provision [automatically] gave you standing, and you
didn’t need to do more than establish a violation of the statute.” See Carlson, supra note 9, at
959 (quoting interview with Gail Ruderman Feuer).
91.  \* MERGEFORMAT See id. at 962.
92. Then-judge Antonin Scalia noted that the court’s inquiry in Calvert Cliffs Coordinating
Committee v. Atomic Energy Commission was so shallow that the plaintiff committee could
have represented any interest ranging from local landowners to jealous federal agencies.  See
Scalia, supra note 28, at 885.
93. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
94. See generally A.H. Barnett & Timothy D. Terrell, Economic Observations on Citizen
Suit Provisions of Environmental Legislation, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. &. POL’Y F. 1 (2001).
95. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
96. See Ike C. Sugg, Caught in the Act: Evaluating the Endangered Species Act, Its Effects
on Man and Prospects for Reform, 24 CUMB. L. REV. 1, 49-50 (1993).  Opponents of the dam
sought to use every tool at their disposal to stop its construction, including suits under the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and Endangered Species Act (ESA).  See id.  After
the latter proved successful, Congress passed legislation specifically authorizing dam construc-
tion to proceed.  See id. at 50.  Litigation continued, however, as opponents filed suit alleging,
among other things, that the dam would flood Native American burial grounds.  See Sequoyah
v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159, 1159 (6th Cir. 1980).  Several years later, it would
turn out that the ESA claim was specious, as the species in question was never endangered.  See
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foothold for the campaign.  In a similar fashion, environmentalist liti-
gation under the Endangered Species Act over the northern spotted
owl in the Pacific Northwest was motivated more by a desire to halt
timber cutting than to save any endangered species.97  This served the
interests of both environmental activists who sought to prevent log-
ging, as well as private timber companies that benefited from the rise
in timber prices brought about by such restrictions.98
Economic interest groups have also been able to take advantage
of environmental citizen suits due to broad standing rules.  Incinera-
tor companies, for example, have funded citizen suits against cement
kilns by purportedly local, “grass-roots” groups.  In November 1995,
the newly formed Pennsylvania Environmental Enforcement Project
(PEEP) filed suit against Keystone Cement Co. alleging that the
burning of hazardous waste at Keystone’s Bath, Pennsylvania, kiln
posed an imminent threat to public health.  Although a small and
purportedly grass-roots group, among PEEP’s lawyers was former
Rep. James Florio, the chief lobbyist for the Alliance for Responsible
Thermal Treatment, an incinerator association.99  Keystone’s lawyers
became suspicious and sought discovery of PEEP’s funding sources
and the scientific bases for its allegations.  The suit was soon dis-
missed, but not before Keystone learned that PEEP had received
$250,000 from the Environmental Responsibility Fund (ERF), which
was, in turn, controlled by a subsidiary of Rollins Environmental
Services, a major incinerator operator.100  This is unlikely to have been
the only instance in which environmental citizen suits were utilized by
Sugg, supra, at 50.
97. As Andy Stahl of the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund explained at a law clinic in 1988,
“The ultimate goal of litigation is to delay the harvest of old-growth forests so as to give Con-
gress a chance to provide specific statutory protection for those forests.”  See Sugg, supra note
96, at 53. The spotted owl, in Stahl’s words, was a “surrogate” in that it provided a legal mecha-
nism to halt the cutting.  Id.  \* MERGEFORMAT
98. See Owls, of All Things, Help Weyerhauser Cash in on Timber, WALL ST. J., June 24,
1992, at A1 (noting that Weyerhauser, a large owner of private timber land, employed wildlife
biologists to locate spotted owls on federal land so as to trigger restrictions on timber cutting).
99. See Bruce Rubenstein, Outraged Citizens or Public Relations Ploy?, CORP. LEGAL
TIMES (December 1996).
100. See id.  This information was kept confidential under court seal until Keystone sued to
force public disclosure of Rollins’ use of environmental groups to attack the competition.  In
lifting the protective order, the federal district court declared that “when a corporation attempts
to use the litigation process to injure a competitor under the guise of a public interest lawsuit,
this Court will remove the shield of confidentiality protecting that masquerade and allow the
public to judge the merits of the dispute with full knowledge of the debate’s participants.” Penn-
sylvania Envtl. Enforcement Project v. Keystone Cement, Civil Action No. 96-588 (D.C. Del.
1997), at 9.
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special interests seeking economic gain.101
Insofar as citizen-suit standing is not grounded in the demonstra-
tion of an injury in fact, there is little to anchor citizen-suit plaintiffs’
motivations to environmental protection.  If the legal rule does not
require the plaintiff to have an actual environmental stake in the case
at hand, there is little to prevent private plaintiffs from using citizen-
suit provisions as a means of pursuing other agendas—from NIMBY
opposition to development to economic rent-seeking or organiza-
tional empire-building.  If there is no legal incentive to encourage po-
tential citizen plaintiffs to consider the environmental costs and bene-
fits of potential suits, then they will be driven by something else, at
which point any benefit to the environment becomes incidental.
Prior to Laidlaw analysts warned that “major environmental
problems” could “no longer be remedied through citizen suits.”102
This is true if what is meant by “major environmental problems” are
technical violations of environmental regulations for which no party
that satisfied a cognizable injury in-fact was willing to sue.  Yet if
there is no documented harm to the environment, other than failure
to comply with permit conditions that may or may not safeguard envi-
ronmental quality, it is hard to know what “major environmental
problems” would remain unaddressed.
B. Environmental Over-enforcement
When not manipulated by interest groups, the primary function
of environmental citizen-suit provisions is to increase the enforce-
ment of environmental regulations.  In the late 1980s and early 1990s,
citizen-suit enforcement, as measured by the filing of 60-day notices
of intent to sue, greatly exceeded federal enforcement in the courts.103
Yet increased enforcement, even if it modifies the behavior of regu-
lated entities, is not always a good thing.   It is possible to heighten
the stringency of environmental enforcement, increase prosecutions,
fines, and even jail terms under environmental laws, without signifi-
cantly improving environmental quality.104  The amount of enforce-
ment activity may indicate that more good is being done.  It may also
mean that there are more violations to punish.105  Enforcement statis-
101. See generally, Barnett & Terrell, supra note 94; Adler, supra note 30.
102. See Echeverria & Zeidler, supra note 7, at 1.
103. See Hodas, supra note 19, at 1572-73.
104. See Adler, supra note 51.
105. See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND
WHY THEY DO IT 155 (1989) (“Suppose a police officer walking a beat makes no arrest.  That
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tics by themselves say very little about whether enforcement re-
sources—public and private—are allocated in such a way as to maxi-
mize environmental protection.106
Even were it desirable, complete enforcement of federal envi-
ronmental laws is impossible.  Most firms are unable to comply fully
with existing environmental regulations.107  Nor do federal and state
regulatory enforcers have the resources necessary to locate and
prosecute every potential violation.108  But this fact is hardly unique to
environmental policy.  In nearly every area of law, there will be more
violations than can be identified and prosecuted.  The state highway
patrol does not seek to catch and fine every motorist who speeds, nor
does the U.S. Justice Department seek to prosecute every attempted
illegal gun purchase.
Optimal enforcement is nearly always less than complete en-
forcement.  At some point, devoting resources to additional prosecu-
tions will produce diminishing marginal returns.  This is particularly
true where, as in the environmental context, many violators have
technically broken the law but have not caused any measurable
harm.109  Under most environmental laws, violations are not proven
by a demonstration of any actual harm, but rather through a showing
of some failure to comply with permit requirements or meet other
technical rules.  Such deficiencies may or may not impact environ-
mental protection.  In the case of citizen-suits under the Clean Water
Act, the violations that are most often prosecuted by private plaintiffs
are those of which the EPA is aware and has opted not to pursue.110
Full compliance with statutory requirements, such as those in the
Clean Water Act, in no way ensures the clean air or water that pro-
spective plaintiffs desire.  The EPA reported in 1992 that some 18,000
bodies of water would still fail to meet water quality standards even if
all effluent limits were observed.111 The experience of North Caro-
lina’s Tar-Pamlico River Basin amply demonstrates this fact. When
can mean either that no crime occurred or that the officer could solve none of the dozens of
crimes that did in fact occur.”).
106. See Sunstein, supra note 22, at 221.
107. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
109. See, e.g., Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 27, at 880-84.
110. See Rabkin, supra note 88, at 191 (noting that most CWA citizen suits are based upon
permit violations uncovered in “EPA’s own records”).
111. See Bruce Yandle, Community Markets to Control Agricultural Nonpoint Source Pollu-
tion, in TAKING THE ENVIRONMENT SERIOUSLY, supra note 48, at (citing 1992 report of the
EPA Office of Water and Office of Policy).
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the river basin was declared “nutrient sensitive” by the state in 1989,
“all of the direct dischargers were in compliance with their govern-
ment-issued permits.”112  The imposition of stringent controls on the
point sources in the river basin had not been enough to prevent sub-
stantial impairment of water quality from eutrophication. 113  Ratch-
eting down permitted effluent levels further would have done little to
improve upon the situation, as point sources—the only sources con-
trolled by the permitting system—only accounted for 15 percent of
the nutrient discharge.114  In the end, local officials were allowed to
implement a marketable pollution credit scheme to facilitate non-
point source pollution control—a more effective environmental pro-
tection strategy than more stringent enforcement of a permitting re-
gime.115
The bottom line remains that more enforcement is not always
better.  Prosecutors must make judgment calls about which legal vio-
lations to enforce, and which to let go.  Ideally, this decision is made
after a consideration of the relative costs and benefits of each prose-
cution: whether the violator has been identified, the likelihood of
conviction, the extent to which the violator constitutes an ongoing
threat to the public, and so on.  Calling for “full” or “complete” en-
forcement of environmental regulations may make for good political
rhetoric, but it is unsound environmental policy.  Allocating excessive
resources to the enforcement of environmental laws, and the resulting
legal conflicts, can be both economically wasteful and even environ-
mentally harmful.  Overly broad standing for environmental citizen
suits is likely to result in the waste of enforcement resources on regu-
latory violations that produce minimal environmental payoff, and
may even exacerbate the environmental failings of the existing regu-
latory framework.
C. Unintended Consequences
Over-enforcement of environmental regulations is not just eco-
112. BRUCE YANDLE, COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 59
(1997).
113. See David Riggs, Environmental Quality, Biological Envelopes, and River Basin Mar-
kets for Water Quality, in WATER MARKETING—THE NEXT GENERATION 147, 154 (Terry L.
Anderson and Peter J. Hill eds., 1997) [hereinafter Riggs, Environmental Quality, Biological
Envelopes]; see also David Riggs, Market Incentives for Water Quality, in THE MARKET MEETS
THE ENVIRONMENT: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 167, 167 (Bruce
Yandle ed., 1999) [hereinafter Riggs, Market Incentives].
114. See supra note 113.
115. See YANDLE, supra note 112, at 60-61.
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nomically wasteful.  It can also compromise efforts to improve envi-
ronmental quality.  By increasing the potential costs associated with
facility siting and upgrade, over-enforcement can forestall the envi-
ronmental improvement that results from technological advance and
economic development.  In particular, excessive enforcement can
have negative environmental consequences by slowing the turnover
of capital stock and accumulation of wealth.  In addition, excessive
enforcement of existing environmental rules can create perverse in-
centives to take “preventative” action that actually entails the de-
struction or degradation of environmental resources.  The risk of en-
forcement actions can discourage experiments with new ways to
reduce environmental impacts.
1. Slower Environmental Progress
Technological innovation is one of the most important drivers of
environmental progress today.  New methods of production, transpor-
tation, and service are capable of producing more while utilizing
fewer resources and generating less waste.  Innovation in the market-
place can “help us to identify new, less polluting ways to manufacture,
distribute, and consume products. . . . [T]he sooner we innovate, the
sooner we can reduce pollution.”116  Environmental regulations, by in-
creasing the marginal cost of developing and deploying technological
innovations can retard environmental progress.  As a recent study by
the Environmental Law Institute concluded, “our current environ-
mental system . . . has created significant barriers to innovation.” 117
By increasing the cost and stringency of environmental regulations,
citizen suits can make these problems worse.
Even advocates of broad citizen-suit standing acknowledge that
“the citizen suit should be seen as part and parcel of a largely unsuc-
cessful system of command-and-control regulation.”118  This is faint
praise.  “Federal rules and procedures governing decision-making for
protecting the environment often are complex, conflicting, difficult to
apply, adversarial, costly, inflexible and uncertain,” according to the
United States Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Rela-
tions.119  This complexity encourages companies to base compliance
116. See John T. Preston, Technology Innovation and Environmental Progress, in THINKING
ECOLOGICALLY 136, 136 (Marian R. Chertow & Daniel C. Esty eds., 1997).
117. See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, BARRIERS TO ENVIRONMENTAL
TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION AND USE 5 (1998).
118. See Sunstein, supra note 22, at 221.
119. See U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,
INTERGOVERNMENTAL DECISIONMAKING FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND PUBLIC
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decisions upon what avoids a technical violation, not what reduces ac-
tual environmental impacts.120
These problems are compounded by the substantial paperwork,
and uncertainty, that is inherent in the permitting processes mandated
under various environmental statutes.  “New technologies must over-
come a two-step approval process, the first being acceptance by risk-
averse business managers and the second approval by risk-averse
government permit writers.  These two steps greatly increase the cost
and time required to innovate.”121  Title V of the Clean Air Act
(CAA), for example, imposes substantial paperwork burdens on in-
dustrial facilities in addition to numerous opportunities for govern-
ment regulators and activists to intervene and delay facility upgrades
or modifications.  As the ELI report noted, “[t]he permitting process
can also discourage innovation by making the approval process for
new technologies lengthier, more cumbersome, and less certain than
for conventional approaches.”122  Barriers include: “delays inherent in
the permitting system, permit writers’ lack of time, expertise and ex-
perience, the lack of rewards for implementing innovative technolo-
gies, and the cautious approach inherent in a government bureauc-
racy.”123
The threat of citizen suits magnifies the anti-innovation aspects
of the current regulatory regime by increasing the costs and uncer-
tainty involved in the permitting process.  When a new facility is built,
or even an old one modified, new permits may be required.  Insofar
as environmental groups are able to use citizen-suit provisions, such
as those added to the Clean Air Act in 1990, to second-guess regula-
tory decisions, they can increase the marginal cost and uncertainty in-
volved with facility improvements.  On the margin, the prospect of
citizen suits can discourage investments in plant modifications in fa-
vor of investments in other areas.
Budgetary constraints force public prosecutors (other than inde-
pendent counsels) to consider the relative merits of additional en-
forcement activity.  Even when the EPA has made a judgment that
additional enforcement or regulatory tightening is not in the public
WORKS 1 (1992), cited in Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and
Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1165 (1995).
120. See, e.g., Charles W. Powers & Marian R. Chertow, Industrial Ecology: Overcoming
Policy Fragmentation, in THINKING ECOLOGICALLY, supra note 114, at 20, 22.
121. See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 117, at 6.
122. See id. at 9.
123. See id. at 15-16.
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interest, or that leniency in a given case is likely to promote greater
voluntary compliance in the future, citizen suits can be used to sec-
ond-guess the agency’s determination.  As the Supreme Court ac-
knowledged in Gwaltney, “the Administrator’s discretion to enforce
the Act in the public interest” can “be curtailed considerably” by citi-
zen suits.124
There is a growing consensus in environmental law that envi-
ronmental regulations can better achieve their goals if they are more
flexible.125  The EPA, for one, is stressing efforts to experiment with
flexible compliance regimes that place environmental results over the
technical terms of existing regulations.  Existing citizen-suit rules un-
dermine this process because anyone can sue.  Indeed, even
“stakeholder” efforts in which interested parties sit down in an effort
to reach a consensus on a given environmental problem are put at risk
because such efforts can not foreclose suit by the one party that did
not participate.  As a result, over enforcement can prevent the poten-
tial environmental gains and public health protections that such co-
operative efforts can produce.
In the aggregate, citizen suits increase the overall cost of envi-
ronmental compliance.  This too can have negative health and envi-
ronmental impacts as both health and environmental improvement
correlate with economic wealth.  As a general rule, both mortality
and morbidity decline as wealth increases.126  In a phrase, “wealthier is
healthier.”127  Conversely, “when national income falls, there is often a
significant increase in mortality and a decline in health status.”128  Ex-
penditures on regulatory compliance are rarely wealth enhancing, and
therefore increasing regulatory costs can reduce gains in public
health. 129  As Justice Stephen Breyer observed,  “at all times regula-
tion imposes costs that mean less real income available to individuals
124. See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 61
(1987).
121. See, e.g., Karl Hausker, Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Only Path to a
Sustainable Future, 29 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,148 (March 1999).
126. See, e.g., Susan L. Ettner, New Evidence on the Relationship Between Income and
Health, 15 J. HEALTH ECON. 67 (1996); John D. Graham et al., Poorer is Riskier, 12 RISK
ANALYSIS 333, (1992).
127. See AARON WILDAVSKY, SEARCHING FOR SAFETY 68 (1988).
128. James B. MacCrae, Jr., Acting Director of the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, Statement before the Senate Committee on Gov-
ernmental Affairs, March 19, 1992.
129. See Frank B. Cross, When Environmental Regulations Kill, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 729, 742
(1995); Ralph L. Keeney, Mortality Risks Induced by Economic Expenditures, 10 RISK
ANALYSIS 147, 149 (1990).
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for alternative expenditure . . . [which] itself has adverse health ef-
fects.”130  So too with environmental protection. Wealthier societies
have both the means and the desire to address a wider array of envi-
ronmental concerns.131  “Countries undergo an environmental transi-
tion as they become wealthier and reach a point at which they start
getting cleaner.”132  This occurs first with particularly acute environ-
mental concerns, such as access to safe drinking water and sanitation
services.  As affluence increases, so does the attention paid to conven-
tional pollution concerns, such as fecal coliform bacteria and urban
air quality.133  Thus, insofar as citizen suits increase the economic drag
imposed by environmental regulations, they can be expected to
dampen the health and environmental gains that are produced by
economic growth.
2. Perverse Incentives
Overenforcement of environmental regulations can also generate
perverse incentives that discourage voluntary compliance with envi-
ronmental rules and encourage environmentally harmful behavior.
The paradigmatic example of the perverse incentives that can be cre-
ated by environmental regulation is habitat destruction under the
Endangered Species Act.  It is now widely recognized that the ESA
discourages conservation efforts and even creates incentives for habi-
tat destruction insofar as it imposes substantial costs on the creation
and ownership of habitat.  As Sam Hamilton, former Fish and Wildlife
Service administrator for the state of Texas, noted: “The incentives are
wrong here.  If I have a rare metal on my property, its value goes up.
But if a rare bird occupies the land, its value disappears.”134  This eco-
nomic reality creates a powerful incentive for landowners to destroy
130. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE 23 (1993).
131. See Seth W. Norton, Property Rights, the Environment and Economic Well-Being, in
WHO OWNS THE ENVIRONMENT? 37, 45 (Peter J. Hill & Roger E. Meiners eds., 1998).  Norton
notes that insofar as environmental quality is viewed as a “good” then “consumption” of envi-
ronmental quality will increase as wealth increases.
132. Indur Goklany, Richer Is Cleaner, in THE TRUE STATE OF THE PLANET 339, 341
(Ronald Bailey ed., 1995).
133. Goklany observes that while the “environmental transition” for drinking water and
sanitation occurs “almost immediately as the level of affluence increases above subsistence,” the
transition appears to occur at approximately $1,375 per capita for fecal coliform and $3,280 and
$3670 per capita for urban particulate matter and sulfur dioxide concentrations respectively.
See id. at 342.  For a fuller treatment of the correlation between affluence and air quality, see
generally, INDUR GOKLANY, CLEARING THE AIR (1999).
134. Quoted in Betsy Carpenter, The Best-Laid Plans, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Oc-
tober 4, 1993, at 89.
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existing habitat, whenever such actions would be legal, and to avoid
creating or owning potential species habitat in the first place.135
There have been numerous concerns that land use regulations have
these perverse effects at the expense of habitats. For instance,
when the golden-cheeked warbler was listed as endangered as the
result of an emergency listing, the managers of Ross Perot’s devel-
opment companies feared the company would lose its three hun-
dred and thirty-three acre prime real estate to the bird. Being a
neotropical migratory species, the warblers were down in South
America when the decision was made to raze the juniper trees on
Perot’s Hill Country property.136
The creation of recent regulatory reforms under the ESA, such as
“safe harbor” and “no surprises,” were motivated by concerns that
the strict enforcement of prescriptive regulations under the ESA has
negative effects.
Citizen suits, by empowering environmental activists to force the
imposition of regulatory measures even when the administering agency
feels such measures are unwise, can exacerbate these perverse incen-
tives.  After environmental groups sued to force the listing of the north-
ern spotted owl in the Pacific Northwest, the Fish and Wildlife Service
reported that the resulting regulations made private landowners fear
they would lose the use of their land.  This had negative results on habi-
tat as “this concern or fear has accelerated harvest rotations in an effort
to avoid the regrowth of habitat that is usable by owls.”137  Independent
studies of timber harvesting trends reveal similar results from the impo-
sition of habitat protection regulations.138
Citizen suits filed under the Clean Water Act may not encourage
135. See Lee Ann Welch, Property Rights Conflicts Under the Endangered Species Act: Pro-
tection of the Red-Cockaded Woodpecker, in LAND RIGHTS 151, 167-68, 173-78 (Bruce Yandle,
ed., 1995).  Welch relates the story of Ben Cone, a forest landowner in North Carolina who ac-
tively managed his land to create and enhance wildlife habitat there.  Cone’s efforts, which in-
cluded selective harvesting of timber, attracted red-cockaded woodpeckers, a species listed un-
der the Endangered Species Act.  The resulting regulatory land-use restrictions reduced the
value of his land by an estimated 96 percent.  See id. at 175.  Cone subsequently engaged in pre-
ventative action on his other land holdings, clearing timber at a faster rate so as to avoid addi-
tional losses from endangered species regulations.  Cone’s case received significant national at-
tention, and he eventually received an incidental take permit for portions of his land after much
potential habitat had been lost.  See 62 Fed. Reg. 54,121-22 (1997).  See also Sugg, supra note 96,
at 75.
136. See Sugg, supra note 96, at 45.
137. See 60 Fed. Reg. 9484, 9507-8 (1995).
138. See, e.g., Dean Lueck & Jeffrey A. Michael, Preemptive Habitat Destruction under the
Endangered Species Act (Mar. 2000) (Montana State University Working Paper) (indicating that
timber companies have shortened their cutting rotations in response to habitat regulations, re-
sulting in long-term reductions in species habitat).
I - STAND OR DELIVER - ADLER.DOC 04/25/01  9:39 AM
Fall 2001] STAND OR DELIVER 69
environmentally destructive behavior in the same fashion, but they
can discourage voluntary environmental improvements, such as those
which can result from cooperative compliance efforts.  As the Clinton
Administration’s 1995 Reinventing Environmental Regulation report
concluded, the “adversarial approach” to environmental protection
“precludes opportunities for creative solutions that a more collabora-
tive system might encourage.”139  Citizen suits can make this problem
worse.  The prospect of a citizen suit will discourage companies from
seeking to develop or implement new management or control systems
that can improve environmental performance at the expense of an oc-
casional permit violation.140  Citizen suits “threaten any cooperative
compliance by their very nature.  The mere filing of a citizen suit may
destroy ongoing cooperative compliance.”141
These examples are not provided as proof that citizen suits are
inherently anti-environmental.  Rather, they serve to demonstrate
that citizen suits, by tightening regulatory enforcement, can exacer-
bate the existing failings of the current regulatory regime.  What little
empirical work has been done on citizen suits to date reinforces these
conclusions.  Any future effort to assess the environmental value of
citizen-suit provisions must include some consideration of the poten-
tial negative effects.  Given that many citizen suits pursued as a result
of expansive standing doctrines may not produce significant environ-
mental gains, the potential for negative environmental impacts from
citizen suits must be assessed to determine the net environmental
benefits of liberalized standing rules.  To date, no such analysis has
ever been done.
IV.  STANDING FOR THE ENVIRONMENT—AN
ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK
In the wake of Lujan, environmental activists sought to restore
139. See Adler, supra note 51, at 43.
140. By way of hypothetical example, consider an effluent control system that greatly re-
duces average contaminant levels, but that causes a periodic “spike.”  Such a system may signifi-
cantly reduce a facility’s environmental impact and yet would be vulnerable to a citizen suit be-
cause its operation produces an occasional permit violation.  For other potential enforcement
inequities of citizen-suit enforcement, see Cross, supra note 56, at 65-66.
141. See id. at 67.  A similar phenomenon can be observed in the context of environmental
audits.  Companies are less likely to engage in voluntary self-audits of environmental perform-
ance if the audit results can be used in subsequent enforcement actions.  As a result, many envi-
ronmental problems remain undiscovered or undisclosed, and therefore unaddressed.  See Ad-
ler, supra note 51, at 45-46.  See also Ben Lieberman, Environmental Audits: State Carrots
Versus Environmental Sticks 8 (Competitive Enterprise Institute, March 1997).
I - STAND OR DELIVER - ADLER.DOC 04/25/01  9:39 AM
70 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol.12:39
citizen access to court by challenging the Lujan approach to stand-
ing.142  This aim appears to have been accomplished with the Supreme
Court’s about-face in Laidlaw.  This decision will no doubt be good
for environmental litigants, as they will only need to vault the most
minimal hurdles to demonstrate standing.  Yet as the preceding has
sought to show, the liberalization of citizen-suit standing rules might
not enhance environmental protection. The presumption that in-
creasing the number of environmental citizen suits improves envi-
ronmental protection has not been demonstrated through empirical
research.  However, there is empirical evidence that, in at least some
instances, excessive citizen-suit litigation may itself become an obsta-
cle to continued environmental progress.
The preceding is not meant as a defense of the status quo.  It is
certainly possible that effective environmental protection requires
public participation in the form of private legal action to supplement
regulatory efforts to curtail pollution.  Centralized governmental
authorities face many obstacles in seeking to provide optimal levels of
environmental protection, not least of which is the difficulty in cen-
tralizing sufficient knowledge to allocate resources in an efficient
manner.143  Regulatory agencies are also subject to substantial interest
group pressure, which can further serve to distort enforcement priori-
ties.  Liberalizing standing rules so as to unleash a veritable horde of
self-appointed private attorneys general to enforce environmental
regulations through citizen suits is not necessarily the best means of
addressing this concern, however.  Another option is the extension of
property institutions to cover a greater array of environmental re-
sources, so as to provide standing for those citizens whose tangible in-
terests are effected by environmental violations.  There is reason to
believe that the establishment of property rights in environmental re-
sources would both encourage greater resource stewardship and re-
solve the standing muddle created by inconsistent court opinions.
A. Property-based Environmental Protection
The importance of property rights in environmental protection is
well known.  As Garrett Hardin noted in his seminal 1968 essay on
“The Tragedy of the Commons,” the creation of property rights in
threatened resources encourages their protection and sustainable
142. See, e.g., Echeverria & Zeidler, supra note 7.
143. This is one of the seminal insights of Nobel laureate Friedrich Hayek.  See Friedrich A.
Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AMER. ECON. REV. 519, 519 (1945).  See also
BUTLER & MACEY, supra note 24, at 27.
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use.144  In Hardin’s words, “[t]he tragedy of the commons as a food
basket is averted by private property, or something formally like it.”145
Environmental problems, therefore, are essentially “property rights
problems” which are solved by the extension, definition, and defense
of property rights in environmental resources. 146
The creation of property interests empowers owners to act as
stewards of environmental resources and facilitates conservation ef-
forts in the private sector.147  Whereas public or politically managed
lands often suffer, “private owners have the ability to protect their
lands from over use.”148  The recognition of conservation easements
empowers conservation groups to purchase development rights from
a given parcel of land and protect the present ecological values.149
Some states recognize property interests in instream water flows.
This empowers local environmental groups to purchase instream
flows from farmers to improve and maintain fish habitat.150  Interna-
tionally, allowing the commercial utilization and quasi-ownership of
elephants in Zimbabwe has led to larger herds and the devotion of
greater acreage for wildlife habitat.151  In New Zealand and Iceland,
the creation of fishing rights known as “individual transferable quo-
tas” (ITQs) reduced overfishing and encouraged fishermen to support
sustainable harvesting.152  In each instance, the creation of property
144. See, Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1245 (1968).
145. See id.  Hardin’s reluctance to call for broader property rights in other environmental
resources, such as air and water, stemmed from his belief that such resources “cannot be readily
fenced,” not out of any concern that the power of property rights to promote sound resource
use was limited to farmlands and pastures.  See id.
146. See Peter J. Hill & Roger E. Meiners, Property Rights and Externalities: Problems and
Solutions, in WHO OWNS THE ENVIRONMENT? supra note 131, at xi.  For a broader discussion
of this approach to environmental policy, see LIBERTY, ECOLOGY, AND PROPERTY: A FREE
MARKET ENVIRONMENTAL READER (Jonathan H. Adler ed., 2000); TERRY ANDERSON &
DONALD LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM (1991).
147. For a good summary of private conservation activities in the United States, see Special
Report: The Public Benefits of Private Conservation, in COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 1984 363-429 (1984).  It should be noted that here the
phrase “private sector” is used to encompass all non-governmental institutions and undertak-
ings, and not just for-profit corporations and profit-seeking individuals.
148. See id. at 367.
149. See STEPHEN EAGLE, CONSERVATION EASEMENTS AND PRIVATE LAND
STEWARDSHIP (1997).
150. See TERRY L. ANDERSON & PAMELA SNYDER, WATER MARKETS: PRIMING THE
INVISIBLE PUMP 111-32 (1997).
151. See Ike C. Sugg & Urs P. Kreuter, Elephants and Ivory: Lessons from the Trade Ban,
IEA STUDIES ON THE ENVIRONMENT NO. 2, 51-53 (1994).
152. See Hannes H. Gissurarson, Overfishing: The Icelandic Solution, IEA STUDIES ON THE
ENVIRONMENT NO. 17, at 10-11 (2000); Michael De Alessi, Fishing for Solutions, IEA STUDIES
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interests in environmental resources creates powerful economic in-
centives for sound resource stewardship and protection.
The security of property rights encourages owners to pursue the
enhancement of their own subjective value preferences.  Thus, property
rights facilitate the protection of both commercial and non-commercial
values.  Property rights enable timber companies to protect their in-
vestment in planting trees or enhancing forest growth, but they also pro-
tect the investments made by conservation groups in ecological protec-
tion and restoration.  At the turn of the last century, groups such as the
National Audubon Society were able to use private property to protect
threatened species habitat at a time when there was no political support
for government action.153  Indeed, private property empowers forward-
looking conservationists to pursue unpopular ecological causes.  With-
out the institution of private property, Rosalie Edge would not have
been able to protect raptors from government subsidized slaughter
through her purchase of Hawk Mountain.154
Property rights are also the foundation for markets, which them-
selves can produce substantial environmental gains through efficiency
gains.  In the simplest of terms, market competition creates tremen-
dous pressure to minimize costs, and that means finding ways of doing
more with less—producing more widgets with less material and en-
ergy.  Thus, in market economies we see a continual drop in the en-
ergy and material inputs necessary for a unit of industrial output.  As
a direct result of market institutions, humans learn to do more with
less—to meet human needs while using fewer, and less scarce, natural
resource inputs and recovering materials for recycling or reuse where
appropriate.  This can be seen in the replacement of copper with fiber
optics (made from silica—i.e., sand), the downsizing of computer cir-
cuitry, reducing the weight of packaging, the exploding agricultural
productivity, and so on.155  Less material is used and disposed of, re-
ducing overall environmental impacts from productive activity.
Private markets provide constant pressure for efficiency im-
provements and wealth maximization.  As noted earlier, the affluence
produced by markets can enhance both public health and environ-
ON THE ENVIRONMENT NO. 11, at 40-43 (1998).
153. This is summarized in ADLER, supra note 12, at 2-3.
154. See Special Report, supra note 147, at 387-94.
155. See generally Lynn Scarlett, Doing More with Less: Dematerialization—Unsung Envi-
ronmental Triumph, in EARTH REPORT 2000 (Ronald Bailey ed., 1999); Indur Goklany, Richer
Is More Resilient: Dealing with Climate Change and More Urgent Environmental Problems, in
EARTH REPORT 2000.
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mental protection.  The key to such improvements is a system of well-
defined and enforced property rights.  International studies of eco-
nomic and environmental trends demonstrate that “environmental
quality and economic growth rates are greater in regimes where
property rights are well defined than in regimes where property rights
are poorly defined.”156  On both theoretical and empirical grounds,
property rights should be viewed as the foundation for both economic
prosperity and sound environmental stewardship.
B. Pollution Prevention and Coasian Bargaining
Property rights do not only encourage sound resource manage-
ment.  Well-defined and enforced property rights can also play a key
role in stopping and preventing pollution.  At their heart, property
rights establish who has a right to what and, correspondingly, what
rights others must respect.  As Elizabeth Brubaker notes in her study
of the use of property rights to protect environmental quality in Can-
ada,
[p]roperty rights govern who has the right to use the environment
in which ways, and who has the duty to respect others’ rights.  They
establish who must pay whom in order to exploit or protect re-
sources, influencing the costs that polluters and their victims must
take into account before making decisions.157
This is particularly true where the rights are protected by a prop-
erty rule as opposed to a liability rule, as victims of pollution could
seek injunctive relief.158
Consider the following hypothetical example: In an unregulated
world without property rights in environmental resources, a company
that opts to dispose of chemical wastes as effluent into a nearby river
instead of seeking to recycle such wastes or send them to a disposal
facility clearly does so because it is the least cost option.  Dumping
wastes into the river is a rational action motivated by a desire to
maximize profits.  Pollution is the least-cost action in this case be-
cause the river is an open-access commons. As an unowned resource,
156. See Norton, supra note 131, at 51.
157. See ELIZABETH BRUBAKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS IN DEFENSE OF NATURE 18 (1995).
158. See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).  As James Bu-
chanan and Roger Faith observe, a property rule requires that “the permission of the party who
may be potentially damaged must be purchased in advance” and therefore “the bargaining posi-
tion of the damaged party is much stronger than it is under liability-rule protection.”  James M.
Buchanan & Roger L. Faith, Entrepreneurship and the Internalization of Externalities, 24 J.L. &
ECON. 95, 97 (1981).
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there is no one to protect it.  Were the river owned, or were those
who live along the river to have clearly established rights in the con-
tinued use of the river, the company would have to negotiate with
downstream rights holders before dumping its wastes.  If the ecologi-
cal impact of such dumping is negligible, the company could probably
continue as before, and downstream rights-owners would not care.  If
not, the company would have to find a means of reducing the damage,
compensating the owner, or developing an alternative means of waste
disposal.  Failure to satisfy the downstream rights holder risks dam-
ages and an injunction on the polluting activity.  As Brubaker ob-
served in her empirical study, when such rights are enforced, they
provide a powerful incentive for firms to curtail pollution and reduce
the harms it can cause.159
Facing the threat of an injunction, the company might seek a deal
under which the company would provide given levels of compensa-
tion for given emissions as a means of avoiding litigation.  In a sense,
the company would seek to make a Coasian bargain with the holder
of downstream rights, as the company’s ability to keep emitting into
the stream is contingent upon securing the consent of those that
maintain rights in the water.160  Companies would be encouraged to
engage in negotiations with downstream parties because, unlike un-
der the current system, they would have the ability to negotiate with
the rights owners to secure an agreement, and thereby avoid the po-
tential of litigation.161  Insofar as such deals take place, all parties in-
volved consider themselves to be better off.  As Brubaker notes,
“property law does its best job when land is held and exchanged in an
orderly way without litigation.”162
For exchange to take place it is not necessary for one party to
transfer all of its rights to another.  Where property rights are de-
fined, one should expect to see rights holders develop contractual re-
lationships that address their specific needs or concerns.  For instance,
159. See BRUBAKER, supra note 157, at 19.
160. See id. at 120 (noting that “injunctions allow the victim to negotiate his own price.  If
his environment is priceless, he may simply tell the polluter to go away.  Alternatively, he may
bargain away his rights or reach a compromise that benefits both him and the polluter”).  See
also Todd J. Zywicki, A Unanimity-Reinforcing Model of Efficiency in the Common Law: An
Institutional Comparison of Common Law and Legislative Solutions to Large Number External-
ity Problems, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 961, 1009 (1996) (“[A] property rule maintains subjec-
tive value.”).
161. This is essentially the sort of scenario discussed in Ronald. H. Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2-5 (1960).
162. See BRUBAKER, supra note 157, at 8.
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an owner of riparian rights in a stream may be particularly concerned
about the effects of upstream pollution on fish populations.  How-
ever, protecting the fish may not require that upstream firms cease all
emissions.  Rather, it may only be necessary for firms to reduce emis-
sions to a given level to avoid harming fish populations, or it may be
possible for firms to finance mitigation efforts that help restore fish
populations at a lower cost than reductions in emissions.  In either
case, property rights force the polluter to satisfy the rights holder’s
subjective value preference for how her property is used, and also
force the rights holder to consider the values that are sacrificed by
holding out and refusing a deal.  The creation of property rights in the
underlying resources encourages rights owners to discover ways of
reconciling their competing interests so that all parties are better off.
Property rights are essential for this to occur.
Even were the river owned in its entirety by the company itself, it
would not simply dump its wastes with abandon, as that would de-
stroy the river’s value to other potential users.  Any economically ra-
tional corporate executive would have to weigh the river’s value as a
disposal site with competing present and future uses.  The fact that
others in a market system place value on alternative uses of the river
would force the company to consider these uses and seek to reconcile
them with its own priorities, in order to fulfill the profit-maximizing
mandate placed upon it by its shareholders. The activities of private
firms will further be constrained by concern for reputational capital
and public relations.163
The use of property rights to define who has a right to claim an
injury from a given environmental action is opposed on many
grounds.  For one, some assert that insofar as this scheme was the ba-
sis for common law nuisance protections, property rights failed to
protect environmental quality, leading to the existing regulatory re-
gime.164  Yet there is much in the historical record that undermines
this account, including substantial evidence that both legislatures and
courts undermined property rules in favor of liability rules or even de
163. Note that these factors presume that the general public places a value upon environ-
mental protection and environmentally protective behavior by private firms.  The lack of wide-
spread public concern for environmental protection thus explains some portion of the poor cor-
porate environmental behavior that was observed prior to the awakening of the environmental
movement.
164. See, e.g., Robert V. Percival & Joanna B. Goger, Escaping the Common Law’s Shadow:
Standing in the Light of Laidlaw, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. &. POL’Y F. 119 (2001); Frank B. Cross,
Common Law Conceits: A Comment on Meiners & Yandle, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 965 (1999).
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facto easements for polluters.165  The Cuyahoga River burned prior to
the enactment of federal regulations—indeed it burned several times.
But this was not due to any purported failure of common law.
Rather, common law nuisance suits against companies that polluted
the river were explicitly precluded under state law.166
Critics of the property-based framework suggest that transaction
costs, collective action problems, and strategic behavior could prevent
optimal levels of enforcement.  For instance, the cost to an individual
property owner of filing suit by himself may be too high given the
magnitude of the anticipated benefit from a suit.  While the collective
benefit to all of the rights holders along a given stream could justify
the costs of filing a suit, transaction costs and free rider problems
could conceivably prevent the victims of pollution from organizing to
put an end to it.167  Similarly, strategic bargaining by rights holders
could inhibit negotiations from resulting in efficient bargains over the
allocation of environmental rights.168  These concerns are real, but
165. See, e.g., THE COMMON LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT: RETHINKING THE STATUTORY
BASIS FOR MODERN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Roger E. Meiners & Andrew P. Morris eds.,
2000); Roger Meiners & Bruce Yandle, Common Law Environmentalism, 94 PUB. CHOICE 49
(1998); Roger Meiners & Bruce Yandle, Common Law and the Conceit of Modern Environ-
mental Policy, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 923 (1999); CENTER FOR PRIVATE CONSERVATION, THE
COMMON LAW APPROACH TO POLLUTION PREVENTION: A ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION (1998);
YANDLE, supra note 110; Zywicki, supra note 160; Roger E. Meiners, Elements of Property
Rights: The Common Law Alternative, in LAND RIGHTS: THE 1990S PROPERTY RIGHTS
REBELLION 219 (Bruce Yandle ed., 1995); Roger E. Meiners & Bruce Yandle, Clean Water
Legislation: Reauthorize or Repeal?, in TAKING THE ENVIRONMENT SERIOUSLY supra note 48
at 88-93.
166. See Stacie Thomas & Matt Ryan, Burning Rivers, in THE MARKET MEETS THE
ENVIRONMENT 1, 3 (Bruce Yandle ed., 1999).  See also Roger E. Meiners et al., Burning Rivers,
Common Law, and Institutional Choice, in THE COMMON LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra
note 165, at 54, 61 (describing how “the river burned because common law rights that might
have precluded its conversion to an industrial dump were blunted by the Ohio legislature”).
167. See, e.g., Andrew M. Thompson, Comment, Free Market Environmentalism and the
Common Law: Confusion, Nostalgia, and Inconsistency, 45 EMORY L.J. 1329 (1996).
168. In theory, strategic behavior should be a substantial obstacle to efficient trades when
there is an “empty core” that precludes a stable, efficient outcome.  See Varouj A. Aivazian &
Jeffrey L. Callen, The Coase Theorem and the Empty Core, 24 J.L. & ECON. 175 (1981).  In
practice, however, it is not clear that this is a substantial problem under contract rules with ex-
pectancy damages.  As Louis De Alessi notes, “[e]mpirically, there is no evidence that strategic
bargaining has a visible effect on the allocation of resources.”  See Louis De Alessi, Private
Property Rights as the Basis for Free Market Environmentalism, in WHO OWNS THE
ENVIRONMENT supra note 131, at 19.  As Aivazian and Callen acknowledge, “[c]ontracutal ar-
rangements will evolve to force a solution on the bargaining process.”  See Aivazian & Callen,
supra, at 181.  See also Ronald  H. Coase, The Coase Theorem and the Empty Core: A Response,
J.L. & ECON. 183 (1981).  Moreover, the creation of firms and associations can facilitate effi-
cient bargaining.  See James M. Buchanan, The Institutional Structure of Externality, 14 PUB.
CHOICE 69, 77 (1973).
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overstated, particularly when compared to the regulatory alterna-
tive.169  Where externalities are severe enough, property owners have
a substantial incentive to develop associations and firm-like institu-
tions to reduce the transaction costs involved with protecting rights
and negotiating solutions to incompatible uses. In addition, using the
property rights framework as the foundation for environmental pro-
tection does not preclude legislative action to reduce obstacles to
worthy legal actions.
Coordination problems and transaction costs were faced by the
owners of riparian rights in British rivers, largely fishing clubs, in the
decades following World War II, but this did not bar their efforts to
protect their rights.  In 1948, several fishing club members joined to
form the Angler’s Conservation Association (ACA).  The ACA has
helped fishing clubs pursue injunctions against upstream pollution
ever since.  To date, the ACA has been involved in over 1,500 cases
where the ACA sought to vindicate riparian rights against actual
harms caused by upstream entities, both public and private.
In the ACA’s history, there are incidents of a public water author-
ity being successfully sued by a private individual, of an angling
club stopping pollution of an estuary 40 miles downstream of the
club itself, and of ACA lobbying dissuading the government from
handing a license to pollute to large industries.  Although they
rarely make headlines, ACA cases are hugely influential.  Many of
its cases are settled by negotiation before the reach the courts—a
very efficient process, but one that yields little publicity or recogni-
tion for the ACA as a pollution-preventing body.170
In the five decades after its founding, the ACA has brought an esti-
mated two thousand or more actions, “losing only three.”171
Environmental organizations, whether national or local, can play
a similar role in overcoming collective action problems, supporting
victims of pollution who have insufficient incentives or ability to act
in their own defense.  Many rivers are now guarded by private “river-
keeper” organizations that monitor pollution levels, emission viola-
tions, and the like.172  Defining property rights in water resources
would more clearly define what rights river-keepers are empowered
169. See, e.g., Zywicki, supra note 160.
170. Roger Bate, Protecting English and Welsh Rivers: The Role of the Anglers’ Conserva-
tion Association, in THE COMMON LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 165, at 86, 86-87
171. See id. at 97.
172. According to American Rivers, there are some 3,000 river conservation organizations
throughout the country.  Bruce Yandle, Coase, Pigou and Environmental Rights, in WHO OWNS
THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 131, at 119, 145 (citing Chad Smith, spokesman for American
Rivers).
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to enforce.  Were the U.S. to move toward a property-based model of
environmental protection, one can easily envision environmental liti-
gation groups shifting from their current focus on permit violations
and regulatory strictures toward cases of actual injuries to rights
holders.  If the establishment of property rights alone is insufficient to
bring this about, the existing regulatory framework, complete with its
strict liability regime for emission levels in excess of a permitted
amount, could be maintained, with the added requirement that only
those with a defined interest—a property right—in the given envi-
ronmental resource would have standing to sue on its behalf.  For the
reasons outlined below, the combination of greater property rights in
environmental resources and a Lujan standing doctrine would likely
be environmentally superior to Laidlaw and the current regulatory
regime.
C. Property-based Standing
Property rights align the interests of the owner with that of the
underlying resource.  A property owner is more likely to act in the
long-term interest of her property than someone who only has a tan-
gential relationship with the resource.  If anyone is likely to sue when
a resource is threatened, it is most likely to be the resource’s owner or
steward.  The importance of creating defined property rights in envi-
ronmental resources is not only that it encourages sound stewardship
of resources, but it also encourages voluntary exchanges and the crea-
tion of associations that maximize the interests of concerned parties.
Without the establishment of such rights, however, such exchange is
not possible, and the potential gains from trade are lost.173  Thus, lib-
eralized standing rules, particularly in the absence of defined property
rights in the underlying resources, are an obstacle to the resolution of
environmental concerns through bargaining and institution building.
When rights are defined, upstream firms have the potential to
avoid liability for permit violations by negotiating with affected rights
holders.  With broad citizen-suit standing, however, everyone has a
right to sue and therefore the only means for companies to avoid liti-
gation is to focus on achieving strict compliance with regulatory re-
quirements and permit conditions.  As noted above, insofar as these
structures are not themselves environmentally optimal, environ-
mental quality will suffer as a result.
173. See James M. Buchanan, Politics, Property and the Law: An Alternative Interpretation
of Miller v. Schoene, 15 J.L. & ECON. 439, 442 (1972) (“some structure, any structure, of well-
defined rights is a necessary starting point for the potential ‘trades.’”) (emphasis in original).
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Imposing the CWA regulatory regime on an emitting firm sub-
jects the firm to liability when it exceeds the emission levels specified
in its permit.  Absent any standing for citizen suits, the firm could
avoid liability for its emissions by negotiating with the relevant regu-
latory authorities.  Such negotiations could result in a flexible compli-
ance scheme that reduces environmental impacts.174  Yet they may
also result in a deal that protects the firm’s interests at the expense of
environmental protection.  As noted at the outset of this article, citi-
zen-suit provisions seek to address this concern by allowing private
enforcement of the permit requirements.
Once private enforcement of permit terms is allowed, emitting
firms now face a broader set of parties with whom they must negoti-
ate to avoid liability.  This increases the transaction costs of such ne-
gotiations, although it arguably reduces the threat of sub-optimal re-
sults from “agency capture.”  Citizen suits, at least in theory, give
affected citizens a place at the table so that their interests are not un-
derrepresented.  Yet under the Laidlaw approach to standing, the
universe of potentially affected parties becomes infinite, precluding
any potential bargain among affected parties.  The only way to pre-
clude suits is either full compliance with permit terms or a diligent
government prosecution.  In a sense, liberalized standing for citizen
suits creates a new commons problem with over-litigation replacing
overgrazing.  Just as no herder will forego placing an additional ani-
mal on the commons because there is no means to reap the environ-
mental benefit of controlled use, no plaintiff (and, indeed, no defen-
dant) will forego litigation in pursuit of a cooperative solution as
there is no mechanism to prevent suit by another party.  Recognizing
property rights in environmental resources for the purpose of citizen
suits facilitates bargaining and allows for the use of narrower standing
rules without excluding the interests of potentially affected third par-
ties.175
Under the Lujan approach, standing cannot be based upon “con-
gressional conferral upon all persons of an abstract, self-contained,
noninstrumental ‘right.’”176  It can, however, be based upon the recog-
nition of rights in property resources.  “If Defenders had had a prop-
174. See supra Part IV.B.
175. See Zywicki, supra note 160, at 1010 (noting that through the creation of property
rights the common law framework internalizes the interests of third parties); David Schmidtz,
The Institution of Property, in THE COMMON LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 165, at
109, 120 (noting that “privatization has the advantage of limiting the number of people having
to be consulted about how to deal with the externality, which reduces transaction costs”).
176. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573 (1992).
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erty interest in Nile crocodiles and Asian elephants, there would have
been no question of standing when they attempted to protect that in-
terest in court.”177  As even one of the harshest critics of Lujan ac-
knowledged, “if Congress [were to create] property rights, . . . the
Court would not be dealing with a ‘citizen suit’ at all.  Instead it
would be faced with a suit brought by property holders equipped with
causes of action.”178
The required demonstration of harm under a property rights
scheme need not be the same as would be required under a common
law action.  At present, the Clean Water Act creates presumptive li-
ability for a company that exceeds the emissions allowed under its
permit.  A mere showing that such a violation has a measurable im-
pact on a resource in which a downstream party has a right could be
deemed sufficient to establish the injury in fact.  Congress could also
amend the Clean Water Act to modify other presumptions or eviden-
tiary rules to make it even easier for plaintiffs to prevail.  Such re-
forms would operate to reinforce common law property rights protec-
tions, rather than to supplant them with a regulatory scheme, and
would pose less risk of underenforcement than the current regime.
Once the rights are defined, this creates opportunities for prop-
erty owners and offending facilities to develop new means of reducing
the environmental impacts of polluting behavior.  An illustrative ex-
ample of the sorts of institutional arrangements that are possible is
the effluent trading regime for non-point source pollution in the Tar-
Pamlico River Basin.179  The designation of the area as nutrient sensi-
tive created a binding constraint upon private firms that emitted into
the watershed.  Much like a firm in violation of its NPDES permits,
the firms that emitted into the Tar-Pamlico faced potentially severe
restrictions on their activities if they did not develop an alternative
solution.  Recognizing that the imposition of additional controls
would be unlikely to improve local water quality, the state provided
local firms with a window of opportunity: If the firms could come up
with an alternative means of reducing nutrient loading of the water-
shed, they would not be subject to additional, exceedingly stringent
point source controls.  The obvious solution was to find a means for
point source firms to facilitate the control of nonpoint source pollu-
tion, particularly that from agriculture.  This led to the creation of the
177. See Sam Kazman, Defenders of Their Own Wildlife, CEI UPDATE, June 1982 at 1, 3.
178. See Sunstein, supra note 22, at 235.
179. This discussion draws on Riggs, Market Incentives, supra note 113, Riggs, Environ-
mental Quality, Biological Envelopes, supra note 113, and YANDLE, supra note 112.
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Tar Pamlico Association, “the first transacting water pollution control
trading community in North America.”180
The Association is made up of participating companies in the wa-
tershed.  It funds sampling, computer modeling of nutrient loads and
their ecological impact, and coordinates efforts to reduce nonpoint
source emissions by paying farmers to engage in agricultural practices
that reduce runoff.  In a sense, the Association is a transaction cost-
reducing firm for companies in the watershed.  If companies had to
negotiate with farmers individually, the cost of the trading regime
would be insurmountable.
Much as a firm that violated its NPDES permit could face a
choice between complying with the permit requirement or negotiating
an alternative settlement with downstream property holders, permit-
ted facilities in the Tar Pamlico had a choice of joining the Associa-
tion or suffering the imposition of more stringent regulatory require-
ments.  One of the things that makes this type of arrangement
possible and stable over time is the regulatory agencies’ commitment
to forego the imposition of yet another round of regulatory require-
ments on companies that hold up their end of the bargain.  Without
this reassurance, firms will not enter into this sort of arrangement, nor
will they negotiate environmentally superior alternatives to reflexive
compliance with permit conditions.  Absent some limitation on the
universe of potential citizen-suit plaintiffs, no such deal is possible be-
tween violating firms and members of potentially affected communi-
ties.
What is important about the property scheme is less the determi-
nation of what constitutes an injury—though this determination does
matter—than the determination of who owns the rights to what, and
who has the right to take legal action against a polluting party.
Whether injury is defined by a physical invasion of another’s property
or a threat of harm above a given threshold or something else, what is
most important is identifying which parties are “injured” by the of-
fending action and therefore have standing to sue.  Establishing prop-
erty rights—not expanding standing rules—is the most sensible means
to achieve this goal.
Establishing property rights in potentially threatened resources
helps channel private litigation concerning environmental harm to-
ward those cases that actually matter to environmental quality.
Those with rights to a resource are likely to be the first to be aware of
180. Riggs, Market Incentives, supra note 113, at 154.
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a given environmental threat, and are most likely to take action
against it.  By the same token, a property owner is less likely to use
her property as a proxy for another interest in legal action if doing so
could compromise the protection of the resource.  When standing is
divorced from such an interest, it is more likely that a given litigant
may be motivated by some concern other than protecting the envi-
ronmental resource in question.  Equally important, once property
rights are established, Coasian bargaining and other efforts to arrive
at optimal resource management arrangements are possible.  This
sort of bargaining already occurs where rights are defined.  Absent
the definition of property rights, however, such innovation is difficult
if not impossible.
CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that Lujan made it more difficult for Friends
of the Earth, Natural Resources Defense Council, and other envi-
ronmental activist groups to walk into court and pronounce them-
selves the Lorax, speaking for the trees.  The Lujan approach re-
stricted standing to those with an actual, tangible stake in the matter,
but it is far from clear that this undermined environmental protection.
By tying citizen-suit standing to concrete, particularized environ-
mental harms, the Lujan approach to standing ensured that only
those with a tangible stake in a given environmental concern would
have standing to sue.  While it may have reduced the overall volume
of litigation, the Lujan approach also served to align litigants’ incen-
tives with the desire to protect a specific environmental resource and
lessened the likelihood that the citizen suit in question was merely a
proxy for some other social goal.
The Laidlaw majority’s emasculation of the harm requirement
for standing will no doubt increase the volume of environmental citi-
zen suits. The courthouse doors have been flung wide open to envi-
ronmental activists.  But before we celebrate this as an environmental
victory, we should ask whether more litigation over technical viola-
tions and aesthetic harms serves the broader goals of cleaner air,
purer water, and the safeguarding of the natural world.  Insofar as
liberalized standing rules serve to increase the stringency of existing
environmental rules, they could well exacerbate the inefficiencies and
perverse incentives of environmental law.
The debate over whether the Supreme Court should adopt a
broad or narrow view of standing requirements for citizen suits under
Article III and the various environmental statutes obscures the larger
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question of what sorts of institutional arrangements maximize the in-
centives for sound resource stewardship and environmental protec-
tion.  The environmental regulatory model embodied in most federal
environmental statutes has not produced the level of environmental
protection that environmentalists would like.  This article suggests
that this approach will remain unsatisfactory even when supple-
mented by the most expansive citizen-suit provisions and the demoli-
tion of constitutional constraints.
One possible alternative is a model which recognizes that envi-
ronmental problems derive from open-access commons, left outside
of market institutions, and that the extension of such institutions to
encompass environmental resources will improve environmental pro-
tection.  Trees need not have standing when there are owners and
stewards with property interests empowering them to stand for the
trees.  This model is more consistent with the Lujan approach to
standing and also creates better incentives for sustainable environ-
mental stewardship into the future.  The standing to sue is a powerful
tool.  To ensure that it advances environmental progress, citizens
should have standing where they have a stake.  If citizens want
standing to move environmental policy, they should seek to stand
where they live.
